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The Afghan Taliban have been steadily making inroads in Afghanistan since their 
removal from power in 2001 and this thesis will look at how their usage of the 
shadow government system and their penchant to provide justice to the local 
Afghan is legitimizing their presence and setting them up to take over power in 
2014.  Additionally, a comparison between the Taliban and Hezbollah will be 
conducted to determine if there are indeed indicators of the Afghan group 
transitioning to a political party, participating in the government, or a takeover of 
power.  Hezbollah is used as an example of a successful transition to a political 
party. An understanding of what the Taliban may do post-2014 is important for 
the US and international community’s military drawdown and subsequent 
withdrawal from the region. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since their removal from power in 2001, the Taliban have been steadily 
making inroads and re-establishing their presence throughout Afghanistan. In 
concert with targeted violence, coercive tactics, and implementation of shadow 
government systems, the political-military organization is cementing their role as 
a viable alternative to Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
(GIRoA).1 A hierarchical leadership structure with centralized and decentralized 
elements outlined in the latest version of their code of conduct, the Layha, 
highlights the Islamic Emirate’s rudimentary approach to governance and attempt 
at legitimization. This is unlike their previous attempt at running the government 
from 1996–2001, which, as Thomas Barfield notes in his book Afghanistan: A 
Cultural and Political History, was “a two track government” with an Inner and 
Central shura that was “poorly adapted to ruling a country or running a 
bureaucracy.”2 Even after some modifications Barfield concludes that the 
“Taliban proved unwilling to make the transition from a social movement to a 
government.”3 Now the Taliban are expertly exploiting certain sectors of the 
government that GIRoA and coalition forces are negligent and deficient in; 
specifically, security and justice where they have made the most impact in 
legitimizing their movement.4 Much of the group’s evolution is not a new concept 
                                            
1. Giles Dorronsoro, “Waiting for the Taliban in Afghanistan,” The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Accessed November 2, 2012, 
https://www.carnegieendowment.org, 1–4, 6; Jeffery Dressler and Carl Forsberg, “The Quetta 
Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: Organizations, Operations, and Shadow Governance,” 
Institute for the Study of War: Military Analysis and Education for Civilian Leaders, Backgrounder 
(December 2009), http://www.understandingwar.org, 5. 
2. Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 261. 
3. Barfield, Afghanistan, 261. 
4. Antonio Giustozzi, “CIWAG Case Study on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups: Taliban 
Networks in Afghanistan,” United States Naval War College (2012), http://www.usnwc.edu, 15, 
21, 31; Kara Jensen, “Obstacles to Accessing the State Justice System in Rural Afghanistan,” 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (Summer 2011), 930.  
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and reminiscent of other terror organizations that have transitioned to legitimate 
political parties, for example, Hezbollah. What are the similarities between the 
two organizations and what are the implications of such transitions? Additionally, 
with a withdrawal date set in late 2014, the U.S. and coalition forces are 
expected to pull out majority of their forces from the country leaving GIRoA to 
fend for themselves, is the governance model the Islamic Emirate has set up 
viable enough to make a power grab?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
In less than two years, the U.S. and NATO forces will reduce their 
presence in Afghanistan to a stripped down training and counterterrorism 
missions.5 The international community has to prepare for any eventuality that 
develops post-withdrawal and one real possible reality is the return of the Taliban 
to power in Kabul. How plausible is this and how will it affect the ongoing 
stabilization missions? Since their removal from power in 2001, the Taliban have 
been regrouping and making headway all over the country and not just in a 
military capacity. Taliban shadow governments started sprouting up in southern 
Afghanistan as early as 2003 and have made their its way into all 34 provinces.6 
The complexity of the governance structure varies around the country but with 
similar intentions; to provide the local population with a viable alternative to the 
Karzai regime. This thesis will analyze different aspects of the Taliban shadow 
governance; what they do and do not do as well as the implications these 
governments have on the future of Afghanistan. The employment of the shadow 
governance apparatus is reminiscent of the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon so this 
thesis will also examine the similarities between the Islamic Emirate and other 
successful political-military organizations.7  
                                            
5. Dan Lamothe, “Dunford Leaves Afghan Withdrawal Plan Fuzzy,” Army Times, Published 
November 2012, http://www.armytimes.com. 
6. Sean Maloney, “A Violent Impediment: The Evolution of Insurgent Operations in Kandahar 
Province 2003–2007,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 2 (June 2008), 204. 
7. Dorronsoro, “Waiting for the Taliban in Afghanistan,” 18; Anisseh van Engeland and 
Rachael M. Rudolph, From Terrorism to Politics (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2009), 38–9. 
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The perceived weakness and incompetence of Hamid Karzai’s regime 
highlights the fragility of a government established with little consideration for its 
own country’s history or cultural and social norms.8 Whether the current 
government can stand alone without serious international assistance will be put 
to the test in the next couple of years as the coalition fully transitions security 
over to Afghan forces. The inability of GIRoA to meet the basic needs of Afghans 
is already an issue that will arguably become more endemic with the 2014 
withdrawal. The Taliban are capitalizing on the central government’s deficiencies 
specifically in the south, east, and other areas out of the government’s reach.9 In 
Helmand and Kandahar the shadow governments are more pronounced and 
complex than elsewhere in the country, but there are shadow governors for each 
of the 34 provinces. In addition, they have made an attempt to provide services 
to the local population and have had success with a readily accessible, swift, 
uncorrupt form of justice — a vital commodity for common Afghans and critical 
component of their organization’s legitimization.10 Other countries have 
experienced attempts at parallel governments some successful like Hezbollah in 
Lebanon and others not so like the FARC in Columbia.11 Since the concept is 
not new it is critical to understand the dynamics of these governance systems 
and how they conflict and impact our current and future counterterrorism 
missions in Afghanistan.12  
                                            
8. Mark Sedra, “Shedding light on the Complexities of the Afghan War,” Central Asian Survey 
30, no. 3–4(2011), 584. 
9. Dorronsoro, “Waiting for the Taliban in Afghanistan,” 4. 
10. Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban’s Adaptation 2002–11: a Case of Evolution?,” 
Cliodynamics 3, no. 1 (2012): 118; Jensen, “Obstacles to Accessing the State Justice System in 
Rural Afghanistan,” 930; Ben Farmer, “Life Under the Taliban,” The Telegraph (2010), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news. 
11. Engeland and Rudolph, From Terrorism to Politics, 7. 
12.Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Refighting the Last War: Afghanistan and the 
Vietnam Template,” Military Review, (November-December 2009), 4, 8; Barbara J. Stapleton, 
“Beating the Retreat: Prospects for the Transition Process in Afghanistan,” Afghan Analysts 
Network, May 2012, http://aan-afghanistan.com, 3. 
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This thesis will examine the Taliban’s shadow governance system. If the 
Taliban return to power in Kabul, the international community has to determine 
how they will interact with the group. The U.S. has already asserted its focus is 
on “our efforts on disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda.” 13 So, a 
reevaluation of the country’s current policy is necessary to mitigate the possibility 
of Afghanistan returning to a status as an international pariah and reestablishing 
itself as a safe haven for global jihadists. Alienating any political entity, even the 
Taliban that emerges in Kabul could be detrimental to stability in the region. 
There have been many missteps along the way that have set the possibility of 
the return of the Taliban in motion, but it is time now to critically evaluate the 
future. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The Afghan Taliban, as an adapting organization, has shown their 
versatility and resilience through its adoption of shadow governments. Recent 
literature highlights their evolution from the time of their original inception with 
less scholarly material on the role or importance of their shadow governments.14 
They are more prominent and sophisticated in southern and eastern regions of 
Afghanistan otherwise known as the Pashtun belt, but the Taliban are installing 
elements of these governments all around the country. There are questions that 
need to be answered to understand the movement more fully and whether or not 
it will be a political force to reckon with after the major withdrawal of international 
troops in 2014. Therefore, this thesis will address three issues associated with 
the Taliban’s usage of shadow governments including the leadership layout and 
interactions, the importance of the justice system, the possibility of imitating other 
similar political-military organizations, and how they compare to the country’s 
past power struggles.  
                                            
13. Foreign Policy, The White House, accessed November 19, 2012, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov. 
14. Giustozzi, “The Taliban’s Adaptation 2002–11: a Case of Evolution?,” 105–123; Thomas 
Johnson, “Taliban Adaptations and Innovations,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 24, no. 1 (2013): 
3-27, http://www.tandfonline.com. 
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First, the Taliban’s leadership and shadow governance structure and how 
it works needs to be laid out and examined. Understanding the dynamics of the 
movement’s political aspect is crucial to unlocking their mystique. If the group’s 
goal is to overthrow the Karzai regime, do they offer a better solution? Some 
would argue that they do because they represent a nationalistic and homegrown 
organization. Research and information regarding the Taliban’s leadership 
structure and shadow government are speculative in nature making it hard to get 
a complete picture of the ground truth. This thesis will attempt to clarify and 
critically analyze the Taliban’s government structure.15  
Second, arguably the most effective aspect of their shadow governance 
system is their justice system. A combination of Shari’a and customary law, 
Taliban justice is swift, easily accessible, and relatively fair making it increasingly 
popular with the local population. Since their legal system is the most successful 
aspect of their governance system; it begs the question whether Taliban justice is 
enough to build and sustain the Islamic Emirate’s legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population and enable them to control the country. There is mention that the 
Taliban provide other public services to the public but little detail exists regarding 
the specifics; at least on the unclassified level. Local support or better yet not 
alienating the rural population is crucial for regime legitimacy in Afghanistan and 
the Taliban understand this better than most.16  
Third, shadow governance or parallel governments are not new 
phenomena and can be found in a variety of settings. The idea is that they usurp 
power and legitimacy from the ruling regime by providing much needed services 
to the people, thus making the government irrelevant. Some would argue that the 
Taliban are succeeding in this arena, but is it coincidence or are they taking 
                                            
15. Thomas H. Johnson and Matthew C. Dupee, “Analysing the New Taliban Code of 
Conduct (Layeha): an Assessment of Changing Perspectives and Strategies of the Afghan 
Taliban,” Central Asian Survey 31, no. 1 (2012): 77–91. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2012.647844. 
16. Jensen, “Obstacles to Accessing the State Justice System in Rural Afghanistan,” 929–
950; Giustozzi, “Taliban Networks in Afghanistan,” 15, 23, 28. 
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pages out of other successful terrorist turned political organizations playbooks.17 
As suggested above, one group that the Taliban exhibit a similar pattern to is 
Hezbollah in Lebanon; especially, when looking at their initial and later phases of 
development into a political party.18 Additionally, there have been alleged 
criminal links between the two organizations through drug and arms dealings.19 
But are these commonalities besides the criminal element able to help explain 
the development of the Taliban’s political depth and will it be enough to make 
them a viable alternative after coalition withdrawal?  
This thesis will address the problems and issues stated above regarding 
the Taliban’s shadow governance. The Islamic Emirate is proving to be a robust 
organization with lasting power. It will be critical in the coming years to better 
understand what they bring to the table and how it will affect future operations in 
the region.  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This project will use contemporary information for detailed analysis and to 
explain Taliban shadow governments. Additionally, this thesis will address the 
implication and viability of these government systems for future possible takeover 
of Kabul. Thus an examination of the current governance structure will be 
reviewed to include what institutions are in place, if any, their purposes, and how 
they interact. In addition, there will be a discussion on the goals for the 
implementation of the shadow governments. A critical component of the Taliban’s 
shadow government is the justice system which requires its own analysis to show 
how it legitimizes the organization in the eyes of the local population. Much of 
what the Taliban have been able to accomplish or publish regarding their shadow 
governance is reminiscent of Hezbollah. Therefore, a brief comparison will be 
conducted to show similarities between the two organizations. After a complete 
                                            
17. Giustozzi, “Taliban Networks in Afghanistan,” 32. 
18. Engeland and Rudolph, From Terrorism to Politics, 38-9, 181.  
19. Richard Esposito, “Taliban, Hezbollah Agents Nabbed in Drugs, Arms Stings: Feds,” ABC 
News online, http://abcnews.go.com. 
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study of the current situation and understanding the higher implications regarding 
the Taliban’s shadow governance will help determine policies for the international 
community’s 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I will be an introductory chapter containing a revised version of 
this thesis proposal, which will set the stage for the paper. Chapter II will be a 
literature review including relevant sources concerning the topic. Chapter III will 
examine the Taliban shadow governance structure to include explaining the 
institutions in place such as the justice system and its importance, their 
composition and purpose, their interactions at different levels, and their goals. 
Chapter IV will explain Hezbollah and how they transitioned from a militant group 
to a successful political organization. Chapter V will analyze the approaches and 
commonalities between the Taliban and Hezbollah while addressing the 
implications shadow governments and transitioning to a legitimate political party 
have on the ruling regime. Chapter VI will conclude the paper with a summary of 














II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is an abundance of literature regarding the Taliban’s rise to power 
in 1994 through their fall in 2001. Information on the Taliban’s current state of 
affairs is available but less scrutinized when compared to the earlier period. The 
level of detail available in unclassified material on the shadow governments is 
finite and usually found in journalistic news articles and other secondary sources. 
This thesis will attempt to piece together the big picture regarding Taliban 
shadow government structures by analyzing the most current literature on the 
subject and focus on whether there are commonalities with Hezbollah. In order to 
compare the two groups, an examination of Hezbollah will also be conducted on 
available data, past and present. The Taliban and Hezbollah pose challenges to 
the legitimacy of the ruling regimes in their respective countries. Organizations 
such as these undermine the central governments and weaken their ability to 
adequately govern the population. Each group uses different elements to rally the 
support of the population. Hezbollah, however, has become the example of a 
terrorist group that has arguably made a successful transition to a political 
organization. Therefore, understanding how violent extremist organizations 
transition and their implications are important in predicting their potential potency. 
A general consensus among experts is that the Taliban are adapting their 
political and leadership structure to their operational advantage. The shadow 
governance systems are becoming an integral part of the Taliban’s political-
military construct with the justice system at the forefront.20 Much of the 
information on the leadership and shadow governance structure is derived from 
the group’s latest version of their code of conduct, the Layha, which has been 
analyzed by a handful of experts. Thomas H. Johnson and Matthew Dupee 
examine the 2010 code and the differences seen between the three iterations of 
the code of conduct that have been distributed by the Taliban over the years. 
                                            
20. Giustozzi, “Taliban Networks in Afghanistan,” 32. 
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They pay particular attention to piecing together the leadership and governance 
structure as specified in the Layha.21 Their assessment provides a possible 
outline for the group’s structure and chain of command, which they believe 
shows weaknesses due to their inherent fractional nature.22 Kate Clark, writing 
for the Afghanistan Analysts Network, examines the 2010 document in its 
entirety, which includes analysis of the organizational structure of the group. Her 
assessment is similar to Johnson and Dupee’s but the terminology explaining the 
elements of the structure varies between the two documents. Clark also includes 
a translated version of the code of conduct as an appendix to her analysis.23 
Lastly, an article found on a Taliban website, Al-Sumud magazine, in 2010 also 
outlines the organization’s structure based on the latest Layha. All convey similar 
messages about the governance structure but due to differing interpretations of 
the original document terminology varies. These sources provide the most 
comprehensive information on how the Taliban’s shadow governance is 
structured. 
A paper written by students at the Naval Postgraduate School entitled, 
“The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis,” published in Military Review also 
provides some background information of the Taliban, a basic structure of their 
organization, and how they are seen as legitimate. The authors assess how the 
group interacts and communicates from the individual foot soldier to the Supreme 
Leader, Mullah Omar. Although a bit dated, the material provides a good 
stepping off point to analyze the group’s dynamic and determine if and how they 
have evolved since 2008.24  
There are also numerous news articles that help fill the gap on the growth 
of the Taliban shadow governance and how they provide an alternative to 
                                            
21. Johnson and Dupee, “Analysing the New Taliban Code of Conduct (Layeha),” 77–91.  
22. Ibid., 87. 
23. Kate Clark, “The Layha—Calling the Taleban into Account,” Afghanistan Analyst Network 
(2011), http://aan-afghanistan.com, 12.  
24. Shahid Afshar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational 
Analysis,” Military Review (May-June 2008): 58–73, http://oai.dtic.mil/. 
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President Hamid Karzai’s regime. An article written for the Washington Post in 
2009, shows that the Taliban were perceived to be prepping for a return to power 
through the implementation of the shadow governors. The article also notes the 
effectiveness of the justice system and how locals seek it out vice the 
government courts. Although there is not much information on other public 
services provided by the Taliban, this article offers insight into their common 
practice of collecting taxes from the local population.25 Another article, in the 
New York Times published in 2011, highlights the Taliban’s “rudimentary civilian 
administration” and tax collection as a means to control rural Afghanistan where 
the central government is lacking.26 Additionally, the piece shows the level of 
sophistication the Taliban are willing to go to ensure the population abides by 
their laws by issuing receipts for the taxes collected.  
Understanding the Taliban’s leadership structure requires some analysis 
of the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), the main leadership element of the group. 
Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Forsberg address the influence of the QST and the 
“proliferation of Taliban shadow governance systems” in their short work for the 
Institute for the Study of War.27 The Tribal Analysis Center also analyses the 
Quetta Shura and the dynamics that make it work including how the group 
consolidates power and the flaws inherent in the organization.28  
Antonio Giustozzi has produced numerous works on Afghanistan and 
some specifically examining the Taliban. In his book, Koran, Kalashnikov, and 
Laptop, Giustozzi provides an overview of the resurgence of the Taliban or “neo-
Taliban” post 2002 including analysis on the group’s organization. His main 
argument is that the Taliban would not have been able to come back in force if 
                                            
25. Griff Witte, “Taliban Shadow Officials Offer Concrete Alternative; Many Afghans Prefer 
Decisive Rule to Disarray of Karzai Government,” The Washington Post, published December 8, 
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com. 
26. C.J. Chivers, “In Eastern Afghanistan, at War with the Taliban’s Shadow Rule,” The New 
York Times, published February 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com. 
27. Dressler and Forsberg, “The Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan,” 7. 
28. Tribal Analysis Center, “The Quetta Shura: A Tribal Analysis,” Tribal Analysis Center: 
Cultural and Geographic Research (2009), http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com. 
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there had been better governance in place to counter them.29 While some of his 
material is a bit outdated — the book was published in 2008 — it still holds 
relevance. Chapter three highlights the group’s organization and command 
structure. The establishment of shadow governments is addressed in chapter 
four; as the author states, “the attempt to project an image of authority stronger 
than Kabul’s.”30 He also notes that the judicial system makes up the crux of their 
governance. Giustozzi also has newer material out on the Taliban; three articles 
of interest are “The Taliban’s Adaptation 2002–11: a Case of Evolution?,” 
“Taliban Networks in Afghanistan,” and “Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun.” 
The first article highlights the adaptability and flexibility of the organization from 
their old ways to post 2002 and on. He calls into question the ability of the group 
to centralize and consolidate their command and control, which is crucial for 
maintaining a cohesive organization. Also he highlights the need for the group to 
be flexible and presents an example of Mullah Omar allowing local commanders 
leeway on imposing social edicts to counter local resistance regarding the 
group’s extreme ideology and hence maintain much needed local support.31 The 
second piece is an overview of more recent (within the last few years) activities, 
strategies, and vulnerabilities of the group. The author notes briefly how serious 
the Taliban have become about “investing significant resources” into their 
shadow governance systems specifically the justice program. It purports that the 
Taliban are seeking not only military victory but political legitimacy from the 
Afghan people.32 The third article is Giustozzi’s latest work and specifically 
addresses the shadow governance, its relevance, and legitimizing factors. He 
proposes that the Taliban are using the justice system, dispute resolution, 
education, and non-governmental organizations as a means to validate the 
organization, but questions the “appreciable effect” they have on the local 
                                            
29. Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in 
Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 7. 
30. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, 112. 
31. Giustozzi, “The Taliban’s Adaptation 2002–11: a Case of Evolution?,” 115, 118.  
32. Giustozzi, “Taliban Networks in Afghanistan,” 32. 
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population.33 Ultimately, Giustozzi concludes that the use of coercion is “a key 
component of the Taliban’s campaign to out-govern Kabul; they are able to 
achieve only limited objectives in terms of establishing a shadow governance 
system.”34  
A main component of the Taliban shadow government system that may 
very well be the linchpin that holds everything together is their justice system. 
Most Afghans seek out informal means of adjudicating justice and simply bypass 
the formal state system because it is simpler, less corrupt, and it is what they 
know. Kara Jensen proposes in her journal article that without a “functioning 
state judicial system” the Taliban have been filling the void with their courts.35 
Noah Coburn agrees with that sentiment in his piece for the United State Institute 
for Peace (USIP) that the Taliban are taking advantage of the chaos seen by the 
rural population in obtaining adequate dispute resolution.36 These experts realize 
in Afghanistan to have legitimacy in the eyes of the locals there needs to be 
readily able fair, swift justice system and the Taliban are offering just that. 
Additionally, they recognize that GIRoA is unable to meet the basic needs of its 
constituents. It does not help the situation that the formal justice system provided 
by GIRoA is at odds with the traditional system and Islamic law. An International 
Crisis Group’s report goes into further detail regarding this critical aspect stating 
that “justice is at the core of peace in Afghanistan.”37  
As compared to the earlier Taliban (1996–2001), the neo-Taliban are 
employing a more sophisticated model of governance. As suggested above, 
much of the group’s recent activities are reminiscent of another terrorist turned 
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political-military organization, Hezbollah. The group’s success at transitioning to 
a political party and its legitimizing factor stems from the social services they 
provided first to the Shi’a population which was expanded to the Lebanese 
population writ large. In the same fashion, the Taliban are following suit, but 
using different legitimizing elements; security and justice, both of which the 
Afghan population require. Are the Taliban emulating the Shi’a group or is it just 
coincidence and a natural evolution for a nationalist movement? As for an actual 
link between the two groups, an article on ABCNews online by Richard Esposito 
connects the two groups through an alleged arms and drugs ring.38 There is a 
gap of research specifically on this particular aspect, but aside from possible 
criminal connection other similarities can be drawn between the two 
organizations. The book From Terrorism to Politics shows how Hezbollah 
legitimized itself to become the dominating political party in Lebanon by meeting 
several factors including: “political will, ideology and programme, organization 
and leadership structure, policies, and internal recognition by the masses.”39 
They started out as a radical ideologically based group that resisted an external 
threat, Israel, through violence but have marginalized their message to increase 
their support base. This book also highlights Hezbollah’s usage of the media to 
sway the population in its favor. As well as the political and social vacuum it filled 
during and after Lebanon’s civil war; specifically, in three main areas; social 
work, education, and health.40 Although evidence of the Taliban’s ability to 
provide these types of social services is limited; but some intent is present in the 
2010 code of conduct, the Layha. Eli Berman’s book, Radical, Religious, and 
Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism, highlights similar sentiments 
regarding the origins of the groups which he submits is based upon an “aspect of 
the ‘Hamas Model’: a radical religious social service provider with political 
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aspirations” as well as the use of violence to resist opposition forces.41 
Hezbollah’s robust social work network is the legitimizing factor to the Taliban’s 
justice system and security apparatus. Additionally, both organizations have used 
other techniques to bolster their political reputation. In Joseph Alagha’s paper, 
“Jihad through ‘music’: The Taliban and Hezbollah,” analyzes how both groups 
use music in some form to mobilize the masses for their cause toward jihad.42 
Along the same lines, information operations are important for both groups with 
each having respective websites, media outlets, and periodicals. Ahmad Nizar 
Hamzeh describes in his book, In the Path of Hizbullah, Hezbollah’s Information 
Unit, its importance in getting the organization’s message out, and the robust 
nature of their media outlets.43 Similarly the Taliban have a cultural and 
information affairs committee and have shown increasingly savvy media skills 
through the use of websites and print materials. As part an appendix to her article 
analyzing the Layha, Kate Clark translated the Layha into English, which 
stresses the importance of the having one media representative for the group.44 
Mariam Mufti in a literature review, “Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan,” describes how the Taliban have taken to media technologies to 
spread their word and how this conflicts with the old Taliban’s stance.45 Lastly, 
Jane’s indicates that as one of the central committees of the Taliban shadow 
governance is in fact the “Information and cultural Affairs,” which deals with the 
propaganda of the group.46  
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Before a comparison can be made between the two organizations a 
foundation needs to be built regarding the background and history of Hezbollah 
and how their social work was important to legitimizing the group. Literature on 
Hezbollah is much more readily available due simply to being around longer and 
being more accessible than the Taliban. A book that succinctly describes the 
group’s early years and transition to politics is Hezbollah: A Short History by 
Augustus Norton. Norton gives the reader insight into the fundamentalist ideology 
that Hezbollah was founded upon and has not rescinded.47 But he also shows 
how the group was able to soften their message allowing them to expand their 
constituency base and increase their legitimacy.48 Hala Jaber also provides 
details in Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance on Hezbollah’s history to include the 
manifesto released in the 1985, the group’s organizational structure, and 
services they provide the population. Jaber shows that “Hezbollah’s welfare 
system has undoubtedly brought about an increase in support for the group and 
won it better standing in society.”49 Interestingly, the author notes that the group 
expects those who use their services to “adhere to an Islamic way of life.”50 
Judith Harik in Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism explains how the 
group transitioned from a radical group to a formidable political organization and 
argues they used a third party, Syria, to help transition, which highlights the need 
for outside resources to accomplish their goal.51 The author also examines the 
uniqueness of Hezbollah’s structure and how it filled the gap for what the 
government could not provide the people; which is an important aspect for any 
parallel government to succeed.52 Hizbu’allah: Politics and Religion by Amal 
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Saad-Ghoryeb also explains the reasons for the existence or raison d’etre of the 
group with one being the importance of identifying itself as seeking to rid 
oppressors; in their case Israel. Saad-Ghorayeb also shows how Hezbollah 
reconciled their beliefs to participant in government and how they felt it was a call 
to duty to curb corruption and improve other’s lives.53 An important examination 
of Hezbollah comes from one of its founding members and past Deputy 
Secretary Generals, Naim Qassem, in his work Hizbullah: A Story from Within. 
Qassem provides a unique perspective on the group’s history, structure, social 
work, and transition to the political arena.54 
Literature on the Taliban shadow governance system is limited to 
journalistic news articles and other secondary sources.  This thesis will analyze 
all available information on their parallel government to provide a clearer picture 
of the Islamic Emirate’s current state of affairs as well as how they are trying to 
legitimize themselves.  A brief analysis on Hezbollah and their key legitimizing 
factors will also be conducted.  The literature on Hezbollah is much more vast to 
include secondary sources written by an ex-member and Deputy Secretary 
General.  Finally, a comparison between the two organizations with regard to the 
commonalties that exist and the implications on transitioning from a militant 
group to a political party will performed using the material gained from these 
sources. The next chapter is on the Taliban’s shadow government otherwise 
called the Islamic Emirate.  The discussion will examine the command structure 
and its legitimizing features. 
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III. THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE’S SHADOWY PAST, PRESENT, 
AND FUTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will examine the Afghan Taliban shadow governance 
structure. There will an explanation of the institutions in place with emphasis on 
the justice system, their composition and purpose, their interactions at different 
levels, and their goals. Shadow government systems typically choose a social 
mechanism that is lacking in society. Therefore, this chapter focuses heavily on 
the justice system because this is the main legitimizing function of the Taliban’s 
shadow government. The Taliban are exploiting traditional dispute mechanisms 
for that have existed for a long time in the country.  
The Islamic Emirate ruled Afghanistan from 1996–2001 and employed a 
different type of governance structure than what is being utilized by the group 
today; one that was crafted around a “collective political leadership which was 
consultative and consensus-building, that was not dominated by one 
individual.”55 Interestingly, Mullah Mohammad Omar, as he is now, was the 
overall leader of the government otherwise known as the Amir-ul-Momineen or 
the “Commander of the Faithful.”56 The Taliban were looking to return 
Afghanistan the era of the Islamic caliphate.57 Thomas Barfield best describes 
their governance structure in his book, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political 
History, as “a two track government” with an Inner and Central shura that was 
“poorly adapted to ruling a country or running a bureaucracy.”58 Since this two 
track system proved less than successful, they dissolved the Central shura and 
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placed these individuals in the ministry offices in Kabul while the Inner shura and 
Mullah Omar resided and ruled from Kandahar. Even after these modifications 
Barfield concludes that the “Taliban proved unwilling to make the transition from 
a social movement to a government.”59 The government eventually became 
highly centralized. Additionally, the pre-2001 Taliban overemphasized the military 
and less the political state functions so the “ministers would frequently be away 
from their desks fighting at various frontlines.”60 Also military commanders 
doubled as governors who reported directly to Omar vice going through Kabul 
highlighting a crucial disconnect between the government in Kabul and the one in 
Kandahar since all the decision-makers were in the South. Moreover, the glue 
that kept the Taliban government relevant was its foundation in religion, which 
they claimed “had the potential to transcend all ethnic, political, and regional 
barriers.”61 In the end, this was not enough to keep them in power. 
Since their removal from power in 2001, the Taliban have been making 
progress around the country establishing a military presence and installing a 
shadow government despite sustaining serious military setbacks.62 Not 
surprisingly they have proclaimed over the years that the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan is the only true and legitimate government of Afghanistan and not 
the current regime in Kabul.63 The resilience and innovation of the current 
Taliban movement is important to understand as it foreshadows the possibility of 
what is to come for the fragile, land-locked nation. The Taliban’s knack of tapping 
into the local populace and exploiting the weaknesses of the current regime is 
critical to the success of the faction. One way the Taliban have been particularly 
successful is at providing Afghans with quick, fair justice; something they clamor 
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for and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is simply 
unable to provide them. Until about 2006–2007 timeframe there was little 
evidence of the organization investing much in the shadow government system, 
but by 2008 it became increasingly important to the campaign and by 2010 the 
Taliban were appointing deputy governors at the district level.64 The Islamic 
Emirate has sprung up in areas where GIRoA is unable to control and is 
capitalizing on the weak governance and institutions in place. As of 2009, an 
estimated 33 of 34 provinces had a Taliban shadow government; while in 2005 
there were reportedly only 11.65 In some instances, the Taliban have figured out 
how to out govern GIRoA and make them virtually irrelevant.66 The Taliban’s 
ability to properly utilize and proliferate their shadow governance system, in 
particular their justice system, is a sign that the organization is adapting and 
going to vie for power in Kabul post the 2014 international community withdrawal 
from Afghanistan.  
B. THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE OF AFGHANISTAN 
1. The Purpose of the Taliban Shadow Government 
The shadow government serves a few purposes for the Taliban or the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Primarily it acts as a platform to legitimize the 
Taliban as the proper government in the eyes of the local population and 
international community while rendering the central government invalid.67 Since 
their removal from power, the Taliban have seen themselves as the rightful 
government of Afghanistan and are validated by the acquiescence of the areas 
they control and secure.68 The importance of a functioning bureaucracy was not 
an immediate concern for the group. An article from Al- Sumud, a Taliban 
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propaganda magazine, claims that the development of such government 
structures was the next step in developing a successful Islamic government.69 
The requirement for enhancing the political aspect of their movement; however, 
was not started until 2006, but seen as a way to address the needs and 
grievances of the people.70 By investing in and building up their own 
bureaucracy the Taliban can systematically enforce their power in the region to 
set them up to take over the country later. A political hierarchy and defined 
command structure is not only intended for dealing with the local population but it 
also creates cohesion and obedience among the members of the organization. 
Ultimately, the Taliban’s goal with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the 
jihad is to remove any foreign influence from the country including the Karzai 
government and again attempt to return the country to a caliphate. The group 
claimed that it does not want any part of the current regime so negotiations are 
futile, because they want to control the whole country. But the Taliban, as of late, 
has made contradictory claims that they only want to share power.71  
2. Composition of the Shadow Government System 
The purported organizational structure of the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan is outlined in their latest version of their code of conduct or Layha, 
which came out in 2010. The Layha describes the leadership structure as top-
down and highly centralized with sworn allegiance to the supreme leader who is 
“the axis around which matters pivot.”72 Arguably the need to tightly control their 
members is due to the fear of “fragmentation and maintaining control” of the 
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organization.73 Obedience of those in the Emirate is stressed as a matter of 
religious duty, which is unsurprising given the religious nature of the 
movement.74 On a quick glance, the Layha gives the impression that the Taliban 
have it together with a sophisticated, organized political organization, but this is 
not necessarily the case and this chapter will show otherwise. The Layha does 
provide a guide as to how the shadow governance is hypothetically supposed to 
work and look.  
The highest position is the Supreme Leader or the Amir-ul-Momineen 
(“head of the pious people”), which is still held by Mullah Mohammad Omar.75 
Similar to an autocrat, he technically has the final say on any issue, decree, 
ruling, and other matter relating to the Emirate. Omar allegedly, due to his 
advancing age, has trusted deputies that actually run the day-to-day operations 
of the organization as well as lead the high shura council and main 
committees.76 In addition, there has been little known about Omar as of late 
aside from the Eid messages released on his behalf, but he has become a 
figurehead for the group as well as a rallying and recruiting tool.77 Omar is more 
of a myth at this point than the actual leader of the Taliban.78 He was known for 
donning the cloak of Prophet Mohammad in 1996 and giving rousing sermons on 
the radio, but even then Omar’s identity was kept a close hold among Taliban 
leadership. There has not been a photograph of Omar for more than a decade 
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and the one available is disputed as to its authenticity. Still today all that is known 
of him is through disseminated printed messages and recordings.79  
Under the Supreme leader and his deputies is a leadership council known 
as the high shura council, “Rahbari Shura,” or most notably as the Quetta Shura 
which is based in Quetta, Pakistan. 80 Similar to a presidential cabinet, the 
Quetta Shura is made up of high-ranking Taliban members who advise the 
Supreme Leader or deputies on all matters and activities that are happening in 
Afghanistan. The exact number of members is unknown but reportedly between 
10 and 12 and upwards of 18 members.81 In addition, the shura monitors the 
main committees, which are the Emirate’s equivalency to ministries with plus or 
minus 10 of them and include: Military Affairs, Preaching and Guidance or Ulema 
Council (religious affairs), Ministry of Culture and Information, Political Affairs, 
Education, Finance, Prisoners and Orphans or Refugees, Health, Foreign 
establishments (dealing with NGOs and foreign business opportunities), Interior 
Affairs, and Repatriation Committee.82 Again there is no definitive listing of which 
committees are being currently used by the Taliban leadership, but the four core 
ones are Political Affairs, Military Affairs, Financial Affairs, and Information and 
Cultural Affairs.83 Individuals selected for any of these high level positions must 
be “trustworthy and loyal” as well as pious with some also having multiple duties 
to include also being a part of the leadership council.84  
In addition to the committees, there are four regional military councils, 
shuras or commissions that fall under the purview of the High Shura which are 
also located in and operate from Pakistan. The regional military commissions 
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break up Afghanistan into four zones for ease of control and oversight of the 
organization’s military operations, which are theoretically defined as the 
following: Quetta which covers southern and western Afghanistan, Peshawar 
oversees eastern and northeastern Afghanistan, Miramshah, which is located in 
North Waziristan, controls southeastern Afghanistan and is allegedly under 
direction of the Haqqani network, and Gerdi Jangal, a refugee camp based in 
Baluchistan, controls Helmand and Nimroz.85 The actual layout of their areas of 
influence within Afghanistan is speculative at best. These commissions are made 
up of military commanders who plan, coordinate, oversee, and supervise the 
military activities in their respective regions.86 They are also supposed to take 
direction from the upper echelons of the Emirate leadership as to the course of 
the military campaigns in country. Additionally, they provide a feedback 
mechanism to the leadership by collecting reports from the field or provincial 
leaders on what is and is not working in the battlefield and identifying promising 
fighters for praise and promotion.87 As per the Layha the military commissions 
are to meet as necessary to carry out and further the war plans but it is 
understood that not all members may be able to attend.88 What is unknown is 
how much each of these commissions work together and how regularly they 
interact or if they are completely autonomous. Giustozzi argues in “Negotiating 
with the Taliban,” that these shuras operate autonomously with little to no 
connection between other networks.89 In any event, the regional military 
commissions are the conduit for information and military direction from the 
Quetta Shura to the local level.  
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The next echelon of leadership in the Emirate is at the provincial level with 
the appointment of a shadow governor by the Supreme Leader to oversee the 
affairs of that particular province and manage the war effort. Each governor, a 
military commander is required to appoint a deputy whose sole purpose is to deal 
directly with the people and the political side of the house requiring him to have 
some civil service experience.90 Also at this level the governor is required per the 
Layha to set up a Shari’a court by selecting a judge and an ulema council.91 
Final approval of his selections is made by the higher leadership council (Quetta 
Shura) and supreme leader. The removal of the governor is also decided by the 
Quetta Shura and rotation of this position is done to ensure the governor does 
not build up a local powerbase.92 There is also a provincial commission made up 
of five members, which is a scaled down version of the main committees that 
address and monitor issues in the province such as finances, fighting, dispute 
resolution or legal issues. An important function of the commission is its redress 
capability where they take on complaints about their fighters from the local 
population and adjudicate them. It is recommended in the code of conduct that at 
least three members of the provincial committee reside within the province.93  
If the Islamic Emirate can operate openly in a region then at the district 
level a governor is appointed. He is also required to appoint a deputy, if possible, 
to deal solely with the local population. Similar to the provincial level there is 
theoretically a commission that has similar functions to resolve and deal with 
issues within the district and village levels to include a legal and dispute 
resolution element.94 The Layha dictates that most of the members of the district 
commission should reside in the area or able to easily engage in activities for the 
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Emirate where they live. As of 2010 there were about 180 shadow district 
governors reportedly in office.95  
Both the provincial and district leaders are military commanders first and 
political actors second. An interesting ancillary role of these leaders is as the 
keepers of the organization’s moral compass and purveyors of obedience for 
those under them in the chain of command. They are required to implement the 
articles of the Layha and not allow ‘bad people’ or criminals into the organization 
or the fight.96 There are multiple layers to ensure proper conduct of Taliban 
fighters, but actually discipling them is not an easy task and can affect 
readiness.97 Interestingly, part VII, article 49 of the code of conduct states that 
the provincial commissions are also required “once a month they teach 
obedience, piety and ethics to the Mujahidin of related provinces and oversee 
their demeanor.”98 Another way to keep order within the ranks and a means to 
monopolize the use of violence; only the provincial governor, a judge, or higher 
council can issue a death sentence in legal matters.99 If there are any issues that 
cannot be resolved by a lower commission it is expected to be brought to the 
next higher level of command to be adjudicated. Final authority for anything 
within the Emirate belongs to the Supreme Leader or his deputies for 
decision.100  
The lowest level of command is the group leader or “faithful leaders” who 
report to the district governors and are in charge of the fighters.101 These leaders 
are at the village level and their primary responsibility as per the Layha is in 
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“educating their men in jihad, religion, and morals.”102 Initially group leaders are 
supposed to be appointed by the Emirate, but if one should be killed or martyred 
then they can choose among themselves for a replacement. If consensus cannot 
be reached then the decision is taken up to the next higher command for 
decision. Group leaders are not allowed to ask fighters from other groups to join 
theirs.103 This highlights another way to ensure no one within the lower echelons 
becomes too strong or develops a power base. Much of the organization’s 
success and ability to retain followers, however, depends on leaders with 
charisma and bravado, which at times is at odds with the upper echelon 
leadership.104 The fighters make up the very bottom of the chain of command 
and are supposed to obey their commander and swear allegiance to the 
Supreme Leader.105 The movement appeals to disaffected youth and 
marginalized tribes much as it did the first go around in the 1990s for monetary, 
empowerment, and ideological reasons.106 These fighters provide the first line of 
interaction with the local population. But as per the Layha they are not to interfere 
in dispute resolution among the population, which is supposed to be dealt with at 
a higher level of leadership. Also the fighters are not supposed to seek out 
monetary advances for personal gain through bribes or illegally detain individuals 
for personal gain, but there is evidence to the contrary on all the above actions. 
107  
3. The Reality of the Shadow Governments 
By design the Layha describes the Taliban as having a very centralized 
organizational structure and that nothing should be done that is not approved or 
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ordained by the Supreme leader, his deputy, or the High Shura council.108 Not 
surprisingly the Islamic Emirate is not tied to their words or doctrine. Antonio 
Giustozzi notes that “there is a trade-off between the Taliban’s resilience and 
efficiency, particularly insofar as their resilience is obtained through 
decentralization.”109 The organization can best be described as a “network of 
franchises” with each region having its own distinct flavor.110 So as much as the 
top Taliban leadership would like to control all aspects of their movement, but 
because of the environment they are operating in, they cannot. The lower 
echelon leaders operate more autonomously than how the Layha depicts.111 
Flexibility in the organization is seen in the lack of upholding the strict social 
edicts of the Islamic Emirate’s past such as banning music, growing beards, or 
children attending schools. Mullah Omar has put out that if there is community 
pushback then the local commanders do not have to enforce the edicts giving his 
local leaders the ability to rule as they see fit.112 Although there is a limit to the 
liberties leaders can take, if a shadow governor or senior member is disobeying 
or not performing to the standard of the Emirate then they can be removed or 
relieved from their position by the Supreme Leader. It was reported that Omar in 
2007 removed Mullah Bakht Mohammad (alias Mullah Mansour Dadullah), a 
popular military commander, for not obeying orders.113  
The actual influence of the regional military commissions on planning 
military operations and getting local fighters to execute them is relatively 
unknown. There are many reports and speculation that Pakistan via their Inter-
Services Intelligence agency (ISI), their equivalent to the CIA, is aiding the 
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Emirate in this department. The complexity of some of the more recent attacks 
calls into question the actual ability of the Taliban to plan such attacks due to 
their lack of resources and knowledge of tactics, which brings into doubt the 
actual military potency of the organization.114  
4. Directives, Delegations, and Dealings  
The connections and communication flow within the Islamic Emirate is not 
readily evident. The Layha paints a picture of a highly centralized command and 
control where information is pushed down to the foot soldier. Obedience and 
piety is expected and considered compulsory among the members of the 
organization.115 There are no strong links between the upper and lower echelon 
commands but through the usage of couriers, cellular phones, and basic two-way 
radios the Islamic Emirate maintains control.116 Although the Layha would have 
it appear that the arrangement between the levels of government is more formal 
since it is necessary “for disseminating to Mujahedin and putting into action this 
Layeha and other decrees and rules of the Islamic Emirate.”117 Whether or not it 
was their original intent to publish the Layha as purposefully vague inadvertently 
allows for flexibility in enacting it. The intended audience for the code of conduct 
is arguably its members, the Afghan population, and international community. 
Most of the individuals involved in the organization, not to mention most of the 
population, are illiterate making it hard to believe that their code of conduct is 
being adhered to or is even known.118 Senior analyst Kate Clark quotes a 
notable Afghan researcher in her work for the Afghanistan Analysts Network that 
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“the further you get from Quetta leadership, the more colorless the grade of 
obedience becomes. It is different from when the Taleban were in power.”119 
Violations of the code of conduct are common place.120 Similarly, differences 
exist among the various regions’ leadership styles, how they implement decrees, 
and interact with the Quetta Shura.121  
In the local communities, the Taliban first send out political agents and 
mullahs to assess, exploit, and co-opt them. If the community has been 
discriminated against by the central government or holds any grievances against 
them makes for a more willing convert.122 In some cases, local elders see 
cooperating with the Taliban as way to get back at GIRoA, but more often than 
not they cannot control the Taliban once they come into their village and the 
group ends up getting the upper hand. The Islamic Emirate also looks for and 
exploits the “loose cannons” within a community as an easy way to infiltrate an 
area.123 Much like their earlier effort in the 1990s, the Taliban are exploiting the 
religious aspect of their movement through the “projection of their identity as true 
believers.”124 Although cruel and archaic people still seek them out for the 
governance, order, and justice they provide because it is “more in touch with 
local realities.”125 
5. Legitimizing Elements of the Shadow Government 
The Islamic Emirate attempts to legitimize the government through various 
commissions (finance and education) and minimal services they provide the local 
                                            
119. Clark, “The Layha—Calling the Taleban into Account,” 15–6. 
120. Clark, “The Layha—Calling the Taleban into Account,” 16. 
121. Giustozzi, “Taliban Networks in Afghanistan,” 20–1. 
122. European Asylum Support Office, “EASO Country of Origin Information Report: 
Afghanistan Taliban Strategies—Recruitment,” European Asylum Support Office (July 2012): 19. 
http://ec.europa.eu. 
123. Giustozzi, “Taliban Networks in Afghanistan,” 23. 
124. Semple, “The Revival of the Afghan Taliban 2001–2011,”60. 
125. Sedra, “Shedding Light on the Complexities of the Afghan War,” 588. 
 32
population. Specifically to validate their rule the Taliban use coercion and 
violence, tax collections, security (in the form of roadblocks and checkpoints), 
dispute resolution, education reform as well as allowing non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and most importantly, providing justice through their legal 
system, which will be outlined after this section.126 The extent of how much 
legitimization is seen through these methods varies and is questionable at 
best.127 
Hypothetically each level of the Taliban shadow government has a finance 
committee that monitors tax and zakat (religious tithing) collection. Taliban taxes 
are collected from all walks of life in rural Afghanistan. In some areas, the Taliban 
are going to great lengths to show they are the only game in town by providing 
taxpayers with handwritten receipts.128  Zakat is mandatory Islamic tithing that is 
one of the pillars of Islam and since the Taliban claim to be a religious authority 
they feel entitled to collect it as part of establishing the caliphate in 
Afghanistan.129 This money helps fund the fighting and running the 
administration so a certain amount of the tax revenues are intended to be sent 
back to the Quetta Shura in Pakistan. The money however, is not always making 
it back up the chain of command. Taxes validate a government’s rule over its 
people, because they traditionally fund social services like effective police and 
military forces, healthcare, or infrastructure like roads, however, the Islamic 
Emirate are not a traditional power base.130 
Security is another service the Taliban are providing rural Afghans, which 
is a critical component of their overall strategy. One form is through the usage of 
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roadblocks and checkpoints, which are popping up around the country and even 
in Bamiyan (a notably anti-Taliban region).131 If the Taliban control the roads 
then they can procure tolls and limit the mobility of the population. It shows that 
government forces are unable to maintain control and security of areas in their 
purview and some of these areas like Bamiyan are not remote locales where 
GIRoA has not existed. The Afghan National Police (ANP) has a bad reputation 
and lack credibility among the public for being corrupt. To make matters worse 
the ANP are also being targeted by the Taliban.132 The Taliban are creating 
power vacuums they fill by this targeting campaign, which is causing defections 
and other malfeasance that further hurt the credibility of the police force. An area 
is stable under the Taliban because the local population is too scared to act 
against them and they are left with no other viable choice for security. If there is a 
benefit from Taliban’s form of security is that through the use of extreme violence 
it deters people from committing crimes, but the bigger downside is that people 
are unwilling to rise up against group.133  
 The usage of coercive violence is another method the Taliban use to gain 
legitimacy. Aside from the justice system, this may be the other main method to 
get the population behind them. In essence, the Taliban are establishing “a local 
monopoly of violence—a precondition for any system of governance to 
function.”134 At times the violence seems indiscriminate, but it serves certain 
purposes and is directed towards certain citizens and typically those align with 
the Karzai government or coalition forces. In the end, it causes the local 
population to fall in line with the group because they do not want the same to 
happen to them. Ultimately, the Taliban’s use of violence is successful in keeping 
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them in power and subverting the population. Part of the reason their justice 
system is so successful is that rulings are upheld by brutal force or the threat 
thereof, which is unlike the government’s legal system.135  
In the past, the Taliban banned schools because they were considered 
un-Islamic unless they were madrassas or religious schools. During their reign in 
1996–2001, girls could not attend school and until recently they have maintained 
that position by reportedly closing and burning girls’ schools as well as attacking 
and poisoning female students and teachers.136 Antonio Giustozzi argues in his 
latest piece entitled, “Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun,” that the Taliban 
are reversing their strict stance against education as the local population has 
voiced opposition to the closing of their schools as seen through popular 
uprisings, most notably in Ghazni, but have occurred around the country.137 To 
counter the opposition the Taliban has co-opted state schools, created private 
schools, and offer educational opportunities at madrassas to appease the 
people. They have even opened some girls’ schools. In all cases, the Taliban 
control the curriculum, the teachers, and textbooks at the schools.138 Back in 
2007 the group claimed to be investing $1 million in new religious schools. 
Although there is no concrete evidence that this money actually went to Taliban 
education reform or schools.139  
The Taliban justice system has been the crown jewel of their social 
services. The creation of Shari’a courts in each province by the shadow 
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governors is stipulated in the latest version of the Layha.140 The justice system 
has its own hierarchy within the Taliban shadow governance as well as a system 
of oversights to ensure fairness. Afghans crave swift, fair dispute resolution and 
legal dispensation, which GIRoA is unable to provide them. Most importantly 
Afghans do not have to pay bribes to the Taliban for legal dispensation, which 
are standard for the government’s legal process.141 So people are seeking out 
the static and mobile courts run by the Taliban; even though the brand of justice 
is more archaic people are still flocking to them. As Michael Shurkin stipulates, 
“the provision of justice counts among Afghans’ expectations of the state.”142 
The following subsections will go into further detail of this crucial service to the 
public that gives the state or whoever provides it legitimacy.143 
C. AFGHAN JUSTICE IS LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
Disputes in Afghanistan drive local stability—they do not have roots 
insurgency but can cause or aid an insurgency and in this case provide 
legitimacy.144 The Taliban’s ability to fill a much needed void, adequate dispute 
resolution, and for the local populace highlights the deficiencies of the U.S.-
coalition mission as well as the inability of GIRoA to meet the basic needs of its 
constituents and extend its reach to rural areas.145 Leading causes for disputes 
stem from land and water issues, which are prevalent problems in the South, but 
the importance of justice spans both civil and criminal realms.146 There are 
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currently three justice systems at play in Afghanistan: formal, local, and Shari’a, 
which are at odds with each other; the last two are used by the Taliban in gaining 
traction around the country.147 As a part of the Taliban’s overall campaign to 
undermine GIRoA and U.S.-coalition efforts to unify the country under one 
central justice system, the Taliban justice system is the central vehicle to win 
over and coerce the local population and reestablish themselves as the 
legitimate power players in the country.  
1. Three Justice Systems 
Presently in Afghanistan there are three justice systems at play. There is 
the formal government justice system provided by GIRoA with courthouses, 
judges, formal legal codes, and lawyers. The second system is the most 
common; the informal system otherwise known as the traditional or customary 
justice system, which consists of mostly unwritten tribal codes administered 
through the usage of trusted elders at forums known as jirgas and shuras.148 
Lastly, there is the Islamic system or Shari’a, a universally accepted set of 
religious laws, which is currently being employed by the Taliban.149 Their system 
consists of mullah-ran courts imposing the group’s interpretation and 
implementation of Shari’a law on the populace. The need for legitimate dispute 
resolution among the general public is vital after thirty-plus years of conflict and 
recent influx of returning refugees.150 A credible justice system offers a 
legitimacy factor for the organization that can successfully implement and 
enforce their laws. 
GIRoA’s justice system is modeled after most western-style justice 
systems with a court system that includes local up to supreme courts. There are 
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judges, lawyers, and huquqs (mediators) who mediate, prosecute, and defend 
cases. The formal legal system has thousands of laws on the books and to 
further complicate things, GIRoA’s system is based on a multi-layered framework 
that tries to incorporate state or secular, Islamic, and customary laws into one. 
Needless to say there is little harmony among the three types of law, which is 
due in part to the differences between adjudication, retribution, and restitution 
that are embedded in each of these systems. More often than not the formal 
systems cannot be reconciled with the traditional system or Islamic law.151 It 
comes as no surprise then that there is confusion among those administering 
justice and those seeking justice.152 Another challenge to the credibility of the 
system is the lack of accessibility of courts and inadequate numbers of qualified 
justice personnel, both of which are supposed to be in all districts and provincial 
areas to meet the population’s legal needs, but in most cases many remote 
areas are lacking any government oversight.153 Moreover, the court system is 
considered corrupt with justice seekers having to pay numerous bribes to justice 
officials or police officers.154 The sentiments among Afghans is that whoever 
“pays the most will win” making GIRoA’s justice system less desirable and more 
difficult for the poor rural Afghan to seek out. 155 Another reason GIRoA’s system 
is underutilized is due to the lack of security. Outside of provincial centers the 
Taliban are targeting individuals that work for GIRoA, coalition forces, or Afghans 
just seeking their assistance. Similarly, due to an inability to police and secure 
the population, the central government does not have the ability to provide locals 
protection to use their services or even the authority to back-up verdicts. Not 
helping matters is the public’s adverse assessment of the police force, which is 
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that they are corrupt and cannot be trusted.156 Consequently, GIRoA is failing to 
provide a necessary and basic government service to its constituents making it 
more desirable to use local methods. 
The informal or customary justice system is predominantly utilized 
throughout Afghanistan to resolve disputes and is prevalent outside urban 
areas.157 This system of arbitration and mediation has been around for a very 
long time and is what most Afghans know and are used to. A strong centralized 
Afghan government and associated institutions have never trumped rural 
institutions and more importantly, “informal self-governance has been the norm 
rather than the exception.”158 The procedures and laws that make up customary 
justice are unwritten and a combination of tribal code (which for some is some 
form of Pashtunwali) and Shari’a; although the former is usually in conflict with 
the latter.159 An example to highlight the incongruity of tribal code and Islamic 
law is the usage of baad, which in Pashtunwali is the transfer of women to 
restore balance between families’ disputes usually stemming from murder.160 
The forum for mediation is through the usage of a shura or jirga. Of note, the 
shura has a more religious connotation and decision of its members lacks 
enforcing ability while jirgas are a mechanism for conflict resolution where the 
decisions are final and have enforcing ability. Village elders primarily make up 
the body of both groups. The traditional system is restorative rather than 
retributive and there is no option for appeal due to the impartial and consensual 
nature of the decisions.161 An example of restorative punishment would be for 
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the offending family to pay blood money to a murder victim’s family to restore 
justice and balance. Jirgas and shuras seek to get to the bottom of and 
understand the underlying issue causing the dispute; unlike GIRoA’s system, 
which uses a western approach to justice and only addresses the facts presented 
in a given case.162 Typically, informal justice is more economical, efficient, and 
effective as compared to the formal system. Rural Afghanistan has had its own 
way of dealing with judicial type practices with its own means of resolution, which 
may not agree with how the state handles the same situation or the punishments 
doled out.163 The state and coalition forces have seen the importance of this 
system and are trying to incorporate it into the formal system with limited 
success. The Taliban, however, also see the importance of traditional justice 
through jirgas and are trying to change the dynamics of this system to their 
advantage by killing off elders that do not conform to their ideals.164  
Islamic law or Shari’a is considered universally accepted by all Muslims 
due to the divine nature of the laws. Shari’a means the “path to follow” and is 
“holistic or eclectic in its approach to guide the individual in most daily matters.” 
165 The Taliban are once again using this as part of their battle cry and narrative 
to unify the masses behind their movement, which is ideologically based. 
Interestingly, the implementation of Shari’a is largely left up to the interpretation 
of Islamic scholars, which in the case of the Taliban many senior leaders and 
commanders claim to be.166 The legal codes are based on the group’s 
interpretation of Shari’a, which is more tribal code than religious while being  
deemed harsh and brutal.167 An example that highlights the brutality of the 
                                            
162. Jensen, “Obstacles to assessing the State Justice System in Rural Afghanistan,” 934. 
163. Ibid., 942–3. 
164. International Crisis Group, “Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary,” 13. 
165. Denis J. Wiechman, Jerry D. Kendall, and Mohammad K. Azarian, “Shariah Islamic 
Law,” Published April 7, 2005, http://www.islamawareness.net. 
166. Colin Freeze, “Taliban Religious Courts Extend their Reach into Remote Regions,” The 
Globe and Mail, June 8, 2009, http://www.theglobeandmail.com. 
167. Tom A. Peter, “One More Hurdle in Afghanistan: Justice,” USA Today, March 7, 2012, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com. 
 40
Taliban system is the usage of archaic punishments such as stoning for adultery 
and cutting off hands for theft. They have in some cases created power vacuums 
by killing elders, judges, police officers, or anyone who does not abide by their 
laws.168 Compared to the state system, the Taliban provide Afghans quick, free 
justice, which is drawing them to their courts. Verdicts go uncontested because 
they are considered fair by most participants and fear reprisal by the Taliban if 
they do not concede, which keeps all parties compliant. Since the roots are in a 
local movement, the Taliban has reach to areas the government does not have 
access to.169 
2. Taliban Justice 
The Taliban is capitalizing on the weak governance and institutions 
currently in place while providing the population with an alternate solution.170 
There are reportedly Taliban shadow governments in 33 out of 34 provinces with 
the key component being the justice system.171 In the most recent version (May 
2010) of the Layha, their code of conduct, section 6, article 38 stipulates the 
establishment of Shari’a courts, mobile or static.172 Instituting the justice system 
is part of legitimizing their power and forcing local buy-in as was seen in 
Arghandab in 2007 where the Taliban chose as “safe haven” for future missions 
into Kandahar.173 The court system is most prevalent and organized in Southern 
Afghanistan but can be found throughout the country, even as far north as 
Kunduz. 
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As the structure of the Taliban shadow government and justice system 
evolve they are becoming more hierarchical. The local court system is the most 
basic level and is made up of static and roving or mobile courts. Depending on 
the security situation, the extent of Taliban influence in an area, and the amount 
of resistance from local customs in that province and district determines whether 
they can operate their justice system overtly or must do it in a clandestine 
manner.174 Essentially, where the Taliban have a significant presence, like 
Kandahar, which is considered to have the most complex court system, static 
courts exists. Where security is not in the Taliban’s favor, mobile courts are 
employed and hearings occur wherever possible, but with a preference on public 
spaces such as gardens, homes, public buildings, mosques, and so on. Mobility 
allows the courts to thrive because it brings justice to the people while avoiding 
raids and airstrikes.175 
Taliban judges play an important role in the justice system as they are the 
face of the movement and the foundation of the system. Typically educated in 
Pakistan, they are expected to be removed from local rivalries and are typically 
not from the area they are dispatched to allow for unbiased convictions and not 
building power bases.176 Giustozzi states in “Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a 
Gun,” that the judges are “usually rotated over varying periods of 1 to 2 
years.”177 He also notes that at the district level depending on the Taliban control 
and size of the district that there can be 4 to 7 judges. Additionally, there are 
chief judges who are in charge of other judges in a jurisdiction.178 Not only are 
there mullah-appointed judges but, the Taliban try to co-opt elders and local 
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mullahs under their system and they too have to use the Taliban’s code to 
resolve cases.179 
The next level of the court system is the judicial committee, which is 
similar to a supreme court and is staffed by “relatively prominent ulama and 
mullahs.”180 The responsibility of this commission is to ensure operation of the 
Shari’a courts and deal with issues that cannot be resolved at the district or 
village levels, which includes intra-group and local issues. There are judicial 
committees in each region and is part of a larger provincial committee with links 
back to the Pakistan shuras.181 
There is protocol on summoning a court hearing with the Taliban. To 
request a hearing; one has to be affiliated with the Taliban, know someone within 
the group, be vouched for by a group member, or travel to Pakistan.182 
Conversely, the Taliban also serves subpoenas and warrants to villagers for their 
attendance and testimony in cases.183 Night letters are the commonly used form 
of communications to summon individuals to court. Not everyone seeks the 
Taliban for their justice; sometimes people are brought against their will for a 
hearing. Kidnappings are a common method to bring to court those individuals or 
spies deemed in non-compliance with Taliban laws.184 Typically these people 
are suspected of working for GIRoA, Afghan Army or Police, or the coalition 
forces. In these particular cases, verdicts can one of two ways; acquittal or 
death.185 
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Punishments or hudud (“limits”) are found in Shari’a and are deemed 
unchallengeable for certain offenses such as stealing, robbery, adultery, etc., 
meaning there is no leeway on how to commune such crimes because it would 
be deemed unIslamic.186 Under this guise the violence doled out by the Taliban 
is considered justified because they are following God’s word. Ultimately their 
brutality is used to force people to use their courts or to comply with the 
verdicts.187 Due to their interpretation of Shari’a that is mixed with tribal code, in 
their case Pashtunwali, the punishments are perceived by outsiders as barbaric 
and include beheading, stoning, chopping off hands, lashings, firing squad, and 
so on.188 Not everyone concurs with the sentences the Taliban metes out but 
there is still a large part of the population that does. An example highlighting 
conformity or complicity came in 2010 when the Taliban stoned an unmarried 
couple at the request of their families. It should be noted that this does not 
legitimize the cruel act but shows the “contiguity between the Taliban ethos and 
local views in many areas.”189 If anything it further highlights the deep seated link 
between the local population and the opposition group and that the Taliban’s 
system is more effective and consistent with village norms and morays while 
keeping the central government ineffective and irrelevant.190 
3. Attraction to the Taliban System 
From a Western perspective it seems strange that anyone would willingly 
choose the Taliban to perform a vital civic function such as the resolution of local 
disputes, yet this is exactly what is occurring across large rural portions of 
Afghanistan. Indeed there are many who use the Taliban justice system because 
of coercion or out of fear of reprisal for engaging with government officials, and 
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there are those who are genuinely sympathetic to their cause, but these factors 
aside, the Taliban remain able to attract willing participants for a few simple 
reasons. First, Taliban decisions are expedient. The reported timeframe can be 
in minutes to up to a month depending on the complexity of the case.191 This 
timeliness has very practical benefits to rural villagers whose tribal dynamics rely 
on community harmony. Further, in villages where GIRoA officials are absent, it 
is often impractical for one to travel great distance to seek out an authority figure. 
An out of work Afghan who lives close to Kabul and its government court 
contends, “the Taliban courts don’t disturb people and tell them to wait for a long 
time before hearing a case, or demand bribes.”192 In this light, it becomes clear 
that even the Taliban’s strict form of justice is often preferred by many to no 
justice at all. 
The gentleman from Kabul also hits on several other factors why locals 
choose the Taliban courts—there is no fee involved and they will come to you. 
Unlike GIRoA’s formal system of justice where corruption and bribes are 
commonplace, the Taliban are content to offer their services in exchange for 
political power they garner with each ruling. While GIRoA courts are scarce to 
nonexistent in the countryside, the Taliban system remains easily accessible. 
Even if residents choose to travel to formal district courts to petition their case, 
and wait for a judgment, the verdict is often unenforceable because it did not 
come from a local authority with purview or influence over the area. A final point 
illustrating the attraction to the Taliban courts, and a bit unforeseen, is that those 
who have engaged in the Taliban system reported a higher customer satisfaction 
rating. Surprisingly, even the majority of losers were satisfied with the ruling and 
restitution subsequently imposed.193  
The Taliban’s brand of justice has been able to flourish because of a 
demand for traditional style dispute resolution that the central government of 
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Afghanistan is unable to deliver in its current form. The shear diversity of 
Afghanistan’s population, ranging from tribal to cosmopolitan, render a central, 
one-size fits all type of justice inadequate. To continue to drive along the path of 
a top-down, western style western judicial system will ensure a persistent and 
central role for non-state actors in the lives of the rural population.  
D. CONCLUSION  
As compared to their previous experience running a government, the 
Taliban have developed a more sophisticated model of governance. The Taliban 
have the makings of a legitimate political organization, but they are facing 
impediments to complete consolidation. Will the Taliban be able to maintain 
control over all of the elements that claim allegiance to Mullah Omar? Giustozzi 
best summarizes the group in that the “Taliban are neither particularly efficient 
nor capable nor sophisticated as an insurgent movement, but have been able to 
match their limited human resources in management and educational terms with 
appropriate strategy and tactics.”194 It all goes back to the resilience of the 
movement and their ability to adapt their structure to changes that they may not 
have wanted to make; especially moving away from a centralized to 
decentralized command and control. GIRoA and coalition forces have been 
unable to stop the shadow government, which only finds new ways of operating 
around threats like employing mobile courts. The next step for the Islamic 
Emirate is to further develop their social services they provide the local 
population. The more the group can make President’s Karzai regime irrelevant, 
the easier it will be for the Taliban to take over the country.195 The next chapter 
will be a discussion on Hezbollah and understanding its legitimizing factors that 
aided in its transition from a terrorist group to political organization. 
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IV. HEZBOLLAH—“THE PARTY OF GOD” 
A. INTRODUCTION   
This chapter will provide a background on the Lebanese religious-militant 
group turned political organization, Hezbollah.  History on how the group  was 
founded and its composition will be examined.  How Hezbollah transitioned and 
the reality of the Lebanese violent extremist organization turned political party will 
also be discussed.  There will also be some discourse on the legitimizing 
elements of the organization, and what Hezbollah has used to solidify and 
expand its power base. In Hezbollah’s case, their social work plays an integral 
role in its legitimization therefore a subsection of this chapter will be devoted to 
analysis on this particular aspect.   
Hezbollah exemplifies the militant group turned political party; although, to 
this day they have not fully transitioned and still retain a significant military 
element. The group has essentially been co-opted into the government, but not 
without reservations from group members since this was not their original 
intention.  The group emerged after a series of historic events over a few 
decades that brought about the islamization and awareness of the Lebanese 
Shiites, which “coalesced” groups into action.196 Notably in Lebanon, the Shi’as 
were the most disadvantaged, underrepresented, and economically 
disenfranchised group where the government did little to help them.197  The 
events that played out as being crucial to the founding of Hezbollah were the 
Shiite Islamic revival of the 1960s, the fundamental ideations resulting from the 
1979 Iranian Revolution, and the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982.  
Additionally, there was a split within the preeminent Shi’a group in 1982, Amal, 
over differences in beliefs and interests causing more religious members to 
defect to the fledgling Shi’a resistance organization, Hezbollah.  The leader of 
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Amal decided to co-opt with the Lebanese government, which, at the time, was 
looked upon as unislamic and a move not favored by the more radical members 
of the party.198  Notwithstanding, Hezbollah would not have gotten off the ground 
without the monetary, material, and military support from Iran.199  Up until 
Hezbollah made their official appearance in 1985 with the release of their 
manifesto called the ‘Open Letter’ they operated underground.  Their manifesto 
outlined the group’s ideology and objectives, which was fundamentally religiously 
driven and sought to establish an Islamic state.  Additionally, in this manifesto 
they cited that they would “never participate in any government’s institutions, so 
long as the ‘current decaying sectarian system’ exists.”200  Moreover, the Party 
considered themselves a resistance force and protectors of the “oppressed,” 
which at their onset were the Shi’a and Lebanese population living under siege 
due to the Israeli invasion in the South.201 During those early days, Hezbollah 
used a simple shura-style leadership council made up of three individuals who 
made decisions on all matters for the group to include military, political, and 
social.  Over the years the group has morphed its ideological stance and 
developed a more complex leadership structure to match its growth and 
popularity.202 
Part of the reason Hezbollah has had to transform its fundamental outlook, 
develop institutions, and expand its leadership hierarchy was that the group 
quickly started filling the functions of the ruling regime initially in Southern 
Lebanon, areas overlooked by the government, which quickly built a following 
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and support base.203  In particular, Hezbollah took an interest in providing social 
programs from the onset, which they felt was also a part of their religious duty or 
tenet.204 A second order effect of Hezbollah’s social work made it a legitimizing 
factor for their organization and increased their popularity outside of Shi’a circles. 
Consequently, the group has softened its stance as a trade-off to build up its 
constituency base and by 1992 entered into the national elections winning eight 
seats in parliament.  By 2009 the group held ten seats in parliament and two 
cabinet positions, the Ministries of Agriculture and Administrative Reform.205  
Even as Hezbollah continues to increase its political power base and legitimize 
itself as a political party versus a violent extremist organization; the group refuses 
to give up its militant wing, which ultimately undermines the central government’s 
monopoly of violence. Successful as the transition has been thus far, until the 
group can relinquish their military arm Hezbollah remain only a step above an 
armed group.206   
B. MILITANT GROUP TO POLITICAL PARTY 
1. Organization and Composition 
Hezbollah’s leadership structure within their organization is based on a 
shura-style or council type governance structure.  The organization has 
transformed its leadership structure over the years making it more complex.  
Originally, in 1983 the group’s leadership consisted of a three-man shura or 
otherwise called the leadership council that made all of the decisions for the 
group to include political, military, and social. Hezbollah has the kept the shura 
structure but has increased its size and at one point included nine members but 
was later reduced to seven.  They have also incorporated a figure head or 
Secretary General who is the overall leader of the organization. The shura 
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members were originally elected to one-year posts to the council, but those 
positions have been bumped up to two year terms. From within in that group they 
elect the Secretary General whose term is three years. Later they also created a 
Deputy Secretary General position. Currently, Hassan Nasrallah is the Secretary 
General and he has held the post since 1993.   The “Commander of the Faithful” 
in Hezbollah’s case are the infallible Shi’a Imams and since none are known to 
be alive then their human religious representative falls under the theologian 
jurisdiction of Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran.  He is considered “the Imam’s 
secondary…who carries out the Imam’s doctrinal and jurisprudence function as 
required.”207 Therefore, not only does the group receive ideological guidance 
from Iran but also funding and arms.  
Underneath the leadership council are five boards or council assemblies, 
which include Jihad, Political, Executive, Parliamentary, and Judicial.  The head 
of each board is an individual from the aforementioned leadership shura.  The 
purpose of these councils is to help develop strategic ideas and plans for the 
group under each of the specialty areas.208 The jihad or military apparatus is not 
as well defined as the rest of the organization and is split into two arms; the 
military or resistance and security. The leadership shura controls the military 
through the use of regional and sector commanders.209 The political council 
oversees the domestic political scene.  The executive board manages the 
political party and social service aspects.  The parliamentary council supervises 
the group’s activities in Parliament and deals with their constituency base.  The 
judicial assembly deals with shari’a rulings and mediation for Hezbollah members 
and others.210 
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2. Birth of Hezbollah–A militant group 
Unlike Afghanistan where the country has never been colonized, Lebanon 
is a post-colonial state with a complicated confessional power-sharing 
governance system.  It is based on the 1943 National Pact where the top 
government positions; Presidency, Premiership, and Speaker of the Parliament, 
as well as parliament seats, were divvied up based on sectarian demographics 
from the 1932 census.211  At that time the Shi’as were considered the third 
largest group so they were given the Speaker of Parliament position and were at 
a significant disadvantage to the Christian population, but the Muslims arguably 
were the fastest growing group.212  Much of Lebanon’s civil war from 1975-1990 
stems from the unfairness of the quota system used to determine the country’s 
leaders and representative government.  The Taif Accords of 1989 addressed 
the main issue of power distribution and brought relatively equal representation 
between the Christians and Muslims, but it is still a confessional-style 
government.213  Needless to say this governance style has resulted in weak 
government institutions, the incapacity to truly support its people, and protect 
them from outside threats.214  Civil groups have developed over the years to 
address these problems.  Events spanning over three decades starting in the 
1960s played a role in increasing Shi’a awareness, a group of people who were 
routinely marginalized.  Most importantly, those events precipitated the birth of 
Hezbollah. The incident that tipped the scales was the invasion and occupation 
of Southern Lebanon by Israel in 1982.   
Initially, the predominant Shi’a group was Amal.  A conflict over interests 
and beliefs caused some of the members to break away as they were more 
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radical and desired to establish a Shi’a Islamic state in Lebanon.  These 
individuals would join the fledgling opposition Shi’a organization, Hezbollah or the 
‘Party of God.’215 Iran provided the group much needed funds, arms, and 
ideological guidance.  Not surprisingly, the group started out based on 
fundamentalist Islamic ideals patterned after the successful Iranian revolution in 
1979, and in the same vein considered themselves the revolutionaries of 
Lebanon.  The group was at its most militant from 1982-1990.216 Hezbollah was 
more religiously dogmatic and “refused to accommodate a political system,” 
unlike Amal, who were more secular and trying to in cooperate into the 
government.217  Hezbollah released a manifesto called the ‘Open Letter’ in 1985 
outlining the group’s tenets, which expressed their religious ideals, the need to 
care for their people, and rid the oppressors or Israel. 218  Judith Harik describes 
what lied behind the group’s actions in her book, Hezbollah, as “claims of deep 
faith and literal interpretation of God’s words as expressed in the Koran” and that 
their military actions were “sanctioned by Islam.”219  This allowed Hezbollah to 
justify kidnappings, killings, and bombings, which were rationalized as necessary 
to the winning the cause.220 Most importantly, Hezbollah sought to protect the 
oppressed and not just the Shi’as but all Muslims against the oppressors, the 
superpowers, who at the time were Israel and the West (or allies of Israel). The 
group believed that they were a resistance force and still does.  In doing so, 
Hezbollah was authorized by Islam to use all manners of force since justification 
for jihad had many layers with fighting being one of them.  No group was immune 
to their violence, not even the state.221  
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Throughout the 1980’s and until the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, 
Hezbollah was the resistance force against Israelis.222 By the 1990’s and the 
end of the Lebanese civil war, Hezbollah changed its tune to meet the needs of 
the environment, and as Augustus Norton notes; “Hezbollah has proved 
responsive to the attitudes and aspirations of its domestic constituency.”223 At 
this point and after much internal debate, Hezbollah remained a resistance force 
but decided to enter the political arena both nationally and locally. The group’s 
ideological stance and perceived integrity made them a suitable alternative as a 
Shi’a opposition group in Lebanon.224  
3. The Transition to Politics 
To Hezbollah, Islam was the answer to all of the country’s problems where 
they saw the ruling government as “corrupt to the core.”225 Much of the group’s 
trepidation in going mainstream and getting into domestic politics stems from the 
idea that the organization would turn into what it despised; a corrupt, ineffective 
secular political group in Lebanon. To maintain its influence, Hezbollah has 
provided social services and subsidies through kinship aid associations, 
development projects, and low-income housing to constituents.  Over the years 
Hezbollah has filled the gaps of the ruling government with some local 
commanders creating “mini-public administrations” because they had greater 
capacity and monopoly of force over the state.226  The group evolved to meet the 
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needs of the public while securing its popularity by way of parliament seats and 
continues to do so.227 
In the early 1990s the group was faced with a dilemma as to whether or 
not participate in national elections. There were internal debates about 
transitioning to politics because it threatened the original intent of Hezbollah and 
would be a reversal of some of the Party’s policies.  Two main issues they had to 
reconcile was participating in a non-islamic system and not creating an Islamic 
state.  Naim Qassem, a founding member and ex-Deputy Secretary General, 
describes the problem in his book, Hizbullah: A Story from Within, which was 
“granting legitimacy to a non-Islamic order and thereby extending its 
existence.”228 Before a decision was made, Hezbollah reached out to its sponsor 
and spiritual guide, Iran, for feedback and consent as to whether or not it was 
unislamic to enter into politics.  The Iranians endorsed the Party’s participation. 
Hezbollah rationalized that the parliamentary system had room for interpretation 
and for varying ideas so they could use the system already in place to their 
advantage and make changes within its confines.229 Hezbollah could not just 
jump right in though; a compromise had to be attained on both sides, between 
the central government and the armed group, to allow them admission into 
Lebanese politics.  Harik explains in, Hezbollah, that “for a successful ‘deal’ to 
take place, the radical group must first forswear its hostility to the state and 
promise to abide by the rules and regulations governing all other parties on the 
scene.”230  Hezbollah was expected to play by the rules, which included abiding 
by the constitution that they had at the beginning deemed as blasphemous. 
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Despite their reservations and requirements, in 1992, Hezbollah entered into the 
national elections and won eight parliament seats.231   
Hezbollah has only increased its presence in Lebanese politics and not 
only participates in national but local, municipal elections too.  As of 2009, the 
group held ten seats in parliament and was holding two cabinet positions, 
Ministries of Agriculture and Administrative Reform.232 With the group 
incorporated into the government they can longer overthrow it under the auspices 
of religious calling, which would be in interest of the party hardliners. But 
Hezbollah has been able to disrupt the government by having members resign in 
2006 and calling for demonstrations unless their demands for a “national unity 
government” were met.233  Even with all of its political successes and calls for 
disbarment the group has not relinquished its military wing, an element that 
competes with the central government’s monopoly of violence.234 The group 
rationalizes that they are still a resistance group and requires a military capability 
due to the “constant Israeli threat.”235 Despite Hezbollah’s reticence to relinquish 
their militant wing, much of the group’s success comes from its ability to provide 
social and public services to the Lebanese population.236   
C. LEGITIMIZING ELEMENTS 
Hezbollah legitimized itself over the years by providing services to the 
Lebanese population that government could not. The 1975-1990 civil war left the 
country relatively ungoverned and the central government all but collapsed. 
Power had been divided among factions, militia, and partisan groups.  Hezbollah 
was able to capitalize on the chaos, expand its constituency base, and fill a gap 
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the government was unable to.237 The group brought to light the plight of the 
Shi’as, which provided them a source of identity and an advocate.  Hezbollah’s 
religious piety and disciplined nature added to the group’s legitimacy.  The most 
important element that significantly increased their constituency base and 
legitimacy was their provision for social and public works.238   
1. Hezbollah’s Social Work for Votes 
Hezbollah started early on with the social service aspect of their 
organization.  Naim Qassem argues that the group “paid particular attention to 
social work” and “considered it a Party duty.”239 In essence, the organization felt 
it necessary to respond to the needs of the people.  Interestingly, a second order 
effect of this was increased influence of and built allegiance to Hezbollah while 
reducing the credibility and influence of the central government.  An argument 
can be made that by giving assistance to people and mostly at free of charge is 
another means of recruitment.240 Hezbollah have built up their social and public 
works section and it remains the most important legitimizing function of the 
group.  Initially, the group started out providing services for their Shi’a soldiers 
who were fighting against the Israelis in the South.  Services expanded to 
civilians who were injured or endured a loss due to the Israelis.  Within three 
years of Hezbollah’s establishment they had an association devoted to 
construction and development (Jihad al-Binaa Association) that reconstructed 
buildings, facilities, and homes affected by bombings and natural disasters.241 
Over time the outreach for their services has broadened beyond only Shi’as.  
Additionally, Hezbollah has expanded their areas of operations and range of 
services they provide. 
                                            
237. Qassem, Hizbullah, 228. 
238. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 14, 78. 
239. Qassem, Hizbullah, 83. 
240. Ibid., 86. 
241. Ibid., 83. 
 57
The public services Hezbollah provide are those that should normally be 
provided by the central government.  In addition to the Construction Association 
mentioned above, the group also started collecting garbage in Beirut’s southern 
suburbs free of charge.  Hezbollah has improved drinking water capacity by 
providing areas with additional water tanks, again, free of charge.  The Party 
have also aided with agricultural supplies and services.  Other services 
Hezbollah provides include vocational training, electricity, health clinics, 
education, financial assistance, and cultural clubs.242  Of note, many of these 
services like water and electricity were cut off to inhabitants by General Michel 
Aoun during the civil war; therefore, Hezbollah was only picking up where the 
government had stopped.243 
Hezbollah’s health organization is called the Islamic Health Organization 
(IHO), which has built clinics and hospitals.  The services and medicine provided 
by the IHO are free.  Care for the wounded, military or civilian, is robust and they 
get monthly allowances, medication, and rehabilitation.244 The group also 
provides care for families of members who were martyred or killed.  Orphans and 
others needing help are given aid.  Education is also considered important and 
the Party gives out scholarships and grants.  Hezbollah also assists with school 
fees.245 The organization has built and run schools that use the national 
curriculum, but have religious studies.246     
In order for Hezbollah to provide these services free of charge they have 
received substantial aid from their sponsors, Iran and Syria.  Some would argue 
that Iranian institutions underwrote Hezbollah’s services and got the group off the 
ground. They also have a large expatriate base that the Party draws funds from, 
which are sent into the country.  Additionally, the group runs companies and 
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reinvests the money they receive.247 Hezbollah business holdings include 
supermarkets and other investments.  Additionally, Zakat, an Islamic tax, is 
collected among the people, which further legitimize Hezbollah with the money 
being redistributed to charities, the poor, and Islamic political organizations.248  
Hala Jaber argues that “Hezbollah’s welfare system has undoubtedly 
brought about an increase in support for the group and won it better standing in 
society.”249 They are acting in accordance to their Islamic obligation by aiding 
those less fortunate than themselves, but get an added bonus of increased 
support and legitimacy.  There is an expectation of those who take aid from the 
group that they will “adhere to an Islamic way of life.”250 They are not expected 
to actually get involved in the resistance, but the provisions handed out allow the 
group to monitor its recipients as a form of control.251 
D. CONCLUSION 
There were events in Lebanon’s history that precipitated the birth of 
Hezbollah.  The Party started out religiously dogmatic with a militant bent that 
was anti-government.  A couple factors led the group to reverse their position on 
getting involved in Lebanese politics.  Due to the lack of inaction by the 
Lebanese government, which was in shambles due to decades of civil war, 
required someone to act in support of the Shi’a population. Therefore, out of the 
turmoil emerged a robust social service and public works sector that solidified 
Hezbollah’s standing in the region while legitimizing them as a political party.  
The Party has coopted into the government on its terms and maintains a militant 
wing, which still undermines the central government. The next chapter will 
identify and compare the Afghan Taliban and Hezbollah to include their 
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similarities and differences.  This analysis will help with understanding how 
violent extremist organizations are able to transition to legitimate political parties 
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V. VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS, PARALLEL 
GOVERNMENTS, AND POLITICAL PARTIES— 
IS IT POSSIBLE? 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will look at the commonalities that exist between the Afghan 
Taliban and Hezbollah.  The focus of this comparison will be on whether the 
Taliban are exhibiting indicators of a possible transition from a violent extremist 
organization to a political party, participation in the current government, or a 
takeover of power.  Additionally, an analysis of their differences will also be 
explored to understand how that could explain the group’s potential.  
Understanding how violent extremist organizations use parallel governments, 
legitimize themselves in the eyes of the people, and decide to transition to 
political parties are important for future interactions with their own constituents, 
government, and the international community.  
Shadow governance or parallel governments are not new phenomena and 
found worldwide.  The purpose of these governments is to usurp power and 
legitimacy from the ruling regime by providing much needed services to the 
people, thus making the government irrelevant. Some would argue that the 
Taliban are succeeding in this arena, but is this just coincidence or is this part of 
bigger plan and do they have higher aspirations to become like other successful 
terrorists turned political organizations.252  One group that the Afghan Taliban 
exhibit similar elements and patterns of development to is Hezbollah in Lebanon; 
especially, when looking at the latter group’s initial and later phases of 
development into a political party.253  Notwithstanding, there is an alleged 
criminal link between the two organizations through drugs and arms dealings.254 
Do the other commonalities besides a possible criminal link help explain the 
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development of the Taliban’s recent growth in political depth and what are the 
possible implications for the future? Both groups challenge the legitimacy of the 
central government and weaken its ability to govern; although, each group, differ 
on its central legitimizing element, Hezbollah with social services and the Taliban 
with justice.  Not surprising the similarities that exist can be attributed to 
globalization through the internet, ease of connectivity, and media, working with 
foreign sponsors, and transnational criminal networks. Elements of the two 
organizations that will be compared in this section include doctrine, internal 
leadership structure, use of parallel governance, funding, and foreign sponsors. 
Is the world seeing a possible transition to a political party or a viable alternative 
to the Karzai regime in the making? Differences do exist between the two 
organizations, which will also be discussed; for example, the governments in 
each country, opposing sectarian views, and group demographics. 
B. COMMONALITIES BETWEEN THE TALIBAN AND HEZBOLLAH 
This section is broken down into subsections for discussion on where the 
Taliban exhibit characteristics similar to that of Hezbollah.  The evolution of the 
Taliban indicates that they have adapted and learned new techniques, which 
they have implemented to gain traction in Afghanistan.  Some of the elements 
being used are reminiscent of Hezbollah, especially at their beginning. Even if 
there is not a direct link, globalization and criminal networks have brought groups 
closer together allowing them to look more alike.255  In 1998, Nasrallah, the 
current Secretary General of Hezbollah, referred to the Party’s affiliation in 
Afghanistan as having an “acquaintance with Islamic movements in Afghanistan. 
But because of the nature of our arena and struggle, these relationships are not 
developed to the level of coordination and alliance. We can certainly say that we 
share common concerns and empathize with each other.”256 That statement was 
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made in the late 1990s and since then there has been technological advances 
and global events that would lower the barriers for Hezbollah to be able to share 
ideas or be a role model for other organizations like the Taliban. The Taliban 
exhibit commonalities with Hezbollah in the following areas: doctrinally, internal 
leadership and group structure, usage of parallel or shadow governments, 
funding sources, and foreign sponsors.   
1. Doctrinal Similarities  
Both organizations have exhibited similarities with regards to their 
respective doctrines.  Each group has espoused, at one time or another, an 
ideologically religious outlook and a desire for an Islamic state.  In Hezbollah’s 
1985 ‘Open Letter,’ their manifesto, asserted the group’s radical Islamic ideology, 
goals, and purposes, as well as their enemies and has not changed much. 257  
The resistance group believed the Lebanese government was corrupt and 
unislamic; so they sought the establishment of an Islamic state similar to Iran.258 
Hezbollah believed Islam was the answer to their country’s problems.  The new 
Afghan Taliban has similar sentiments, which have been laid out in their 
propaganda material, edicts, and code of conducts. For example, an article in the 
Islamic Emirate’s magazine, Al-Sumud, issue number 55, explains that the group 
is interested in reestablishing an Islamic state and removing the US from the 
country.259 The Layha or code of conduct, a “rule book” for the Taliban fighter, 
also offers a glimpse into the purported philosophy of the Taliban, which is “to be 
true to their religion, their nation, and their people.”260 The Taliban also see the 
Karzai government as weak, corrupt, and a puppet of the West and therefore do 
not want to work or cooperate with them.  Religious ideology is important for both 
organizations in founding their missions and gaining members with each 
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observing fundamental Islamic tenets, although opposing Islamic sects, 
Hezbollah Shi’a versus Taliban Sunni. These groups are seen by outsiders as 
disciplined, obedient, and pious, which can be refreshing when dealing with an 
overly corrupt state.261  
Religious ideology also justifies violence in both organizations. Hezbollah 
believed political violence was justified against the state to combat severe 
corruption.262 Also as a resistance force against Israel, their sworn enemy, 
fighting was just another aspect of jihad.  The Party’s fighting and resistance was 
credited with Israel withdrawing from Southern Lebanon in May 2000.263  Their 
army has become the preeminent military force in the country and out performs 
the state army.264 But before Hezbollah became this coherent fighting force they 
were a “radical, clandestine militia” that committed acts of terrorism to highlight 
their cause.265 Current day Hezbollah still believes that the Israeli threat is too 
high for the group to disband its militant wing.  The Taliban also justifies its 
military operations and violent acts against NATO forces and targeted Afghans 
as sanctioned by Islam and religious decree.266 The Taliban is seen as a 
network of militias that do not have control of the entire country militarily, but 
have a strong presence in numerous villages and provinces.267  Both instances 
highlight the state’s lack of monopoly over violence and ability to keep these 
violent extremist groups in check.  Legitimacy of the ruling regime hinges on its 
ability to control opposition forces through law and order, which they are unable 
to do in both cases.  
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Religious ideology also influences both groups’ media and propaganda 
efforts.  Propaganda for both groups is geared toward exposing the West’s flaws 
or purported wrongdoings and highlighting the successes of their operations.  
Joseph Alagha shows in his paper, “Jihad through ‘music’: The Taliban and 
Hizbullah,” that both groups exploit religious tenets and “practice jihad through 
music,” which for the Taliban the author equates to their chants.268  For both 
organizations music and chants is a way to mobilize support and get their 
message out. Taliban and Hezbollah also utilize various other media and internet 
sources to reach the public regarding their respective plights. Both organizations 
have radio stations, websites, twitter accounts, and publications geared toward 
spreading their message and publicizing their actions.269 Additionally, the groups 
reach out to international media outlets to get their side of the story heard and 
typically first, much to the chagrin of the western world.270Accuracy of the 
information is secondary to the speed of which the information is disseminated 
and the actual physical event is less important than the propaganda that can be 
gained from it.271 The usage of media allows both groups to spread their 
message and as Marc Sageman notes in the Leaderless Jihad, “successful 
actions are copied by sympathizers, and spectacular action inspires young 
people to join the movement.”272  The internet and media are changing the way 
the world connects, communicates, and forms relationships.273 The ease of 
access and anonymity of the internet allows these groups to bypass classical 
media to get their message out to the world and has become a safe place for 
terrorists to express and exchange ideas as well as gain an audience and 
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members in the process.274 The Taliban and Hezbollah have spokespeople who 
represent and consolidate the group’s message to prevent any divergence. It 
also allows groups to immortalize members who commit acts in the name of the 
organization and make them martyrs.275 Geographic divides are crossed which 
in the past would have taken much longer to reach so “the internet connects 
them to a truly global network.”276 
Although a fundamental religious ideology drives both organizations, the 
Taliban and Hezbollah have shown they are adapting and moderating on those 
beliefs.277  Even though the very idea contradicts both groups original precepts 
both groups need popular support.  In the early 1990s Hezbollah had to rethink 
their ideological stance, reverse their sentiments for an Islamic state, and go 
back on their criticism of the state to participate in national elections. The Party 
could not have made the decision without consulting and getting the approval of 
their main sponsor, Iran.  Hezbollah’s party leaders saw that the parliamentary 
system was exploitable.278  In cooperation with the government, Hezbollah ran in 
the 1992 national elections and won eight seats in Parliament. The Taliban have 
also had to lessen their radical ideological stance on a number of topics as to not 
alienate their support base.279 These include reopening schools and allowing 
music as well as other items typically banned by the group.280 There are also a 
few sources that indicate the Afghan group does not want to “monopolize power,” 
but be a part of the government.281 Mullah Omar, the leader of the group 
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included this sentiment in his 2012 Eid al-Adha message.282  The Taliban have 
some concessions that the group would like addressed for this to happen and 
one being to rework the constitution to ensure it is based solely on Islamic 
principles. 283 Both organizations realize that they need constituents and buy-in 
to further their causes. They also have the same restrictions placed on them if 
the groups decide to work within the confines of the state.284  
2. Internal Leadership Structure 
The Taliban and Hezbollah utilize a similar governance structure within 
their organizations.  Both leadership hierarchies have grown more complex to 
match their growth and popularity.  At the top of each group is the spiritual leader 
or “Commander of the Faithful,” but in Hezbollah’s case that position resides with 
the Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran and is not someone within the group due to their 
Shi’a beliefs.  The Taliban’s supreme leader and the “Commander of the Faithful” 
are one and the same, Mullah Muhammad Omar.  Each group has a leadership 
shura of varying size.  In Hezbollah the leadership shura is made up of about 
seven individuals and from that group one is elected as the Party’s leader or 
Secretary General.  Hassan Nasrallah is the current leader of Hezbollah.  The 
Taliban’s high shura council or Quetta Shura’s membership fluctuates between 
10 to 18 members.285  Below each group’s leadership councils are main 
committees or council assemblies that support the organization’s strategies and 
goals.  In both cases these councils are headed by members of the respective 
leadership shuras.  Hezbollah has five councils while the Taliban has roughly ten.  
Three councils they both have in common are military or jihad, political, and 
judicial. The complexity of the Taliban and Hezbollah’s own leadership 
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hierarchies highlights the need each group had to expand in response to meet 
the demands of the people.286   
3. Parallel or Shadow Governments 
The lack of government in an area can lead to other organizations or 
individuals taking its place.  In the cases of Hezbollah and the Taliban, they have 
built parallel government structures that rival the ruling regime.287  Both groups 
felt that their respective ruling regime was corrupt and inefficient.288   Hezbollah 
built institutions because they did not exist for the Shi’as in Southern Lebanon 
and in the Beirut suburbs. The Taliban installed their own shadow provincial and 
district governors and judges in the provinces due to the lack of GIRoA presence 
and desire to reestablish an Islamic state.  By effectively providing services to the 
community these groups begin to trump the actual government by out-governing 
them.289 The inability of the central government to improve governance at the 
local level drives people to these other groups to get what they need in the way 
of basic services.290  Therefore, if the non-state actor is providing social services 
and governance in manner that is more efficient, effective, and less corrupt than 
the central government then a division in loyalties is created, which is seen in 
both countries.  Other than providing social services, collecting taxes and having 
the monopoly over the use of violence enables the groups to be seen in the eyes 
of the local population as the more legitimate government entity.291  These non-
sanctioned groups fill a political vacuum that already existed or has been created 
by them. Conditions were right in both countries for Hezbollah and the Taliban to 
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set up such systems because they operate in environments with weak central 
governments that have either shown little resistance to the group’s endeavors or 
have been unable to stop them.292  
Hezbollah and the Taliban have found a niche in providing certain services 
that increase the group’s legitimacy in the eyes of their respective populations. 
Hezbollah’s lies in their robust social service section and the Taliban’s are limited 
to providing justice and security. These central legitimizing elements may be 
different but their end results are the same; they boost their popularity among the 
local population and increase their legitimacy over the central government. 
Importantly, the Taliban and Hezbollah play heavily on the local population’s 
grievances to gain a foothold as a way to establish and maintain their presence 
in a region.293 In Hezbollah’s case, the group provided a voice for the historically 
marginalized Shi’as who were ignored by the central government. Lebanese 
Shiites were the “most disadvantaged segment of Lebanese society.”294  For the 
Taliban, the population’s grievances stem from the ineffective, corrupt 
governance and perceived lack of security and justice provided by GIRoA.295 
The ability for these organizations to provide services fast and in an uncorrupt 
manner make them both highly sought after.  Like Hezbollah, the Taliban are 
replacing the state on certain functions because the groups are “more in touch 
with local realities.”296  
4. Funding 
Three forms of funding both groups have in common are zakat, illicit 
enterprises, and foreign donations.  Zakat is a mandatory Islamic tax that 
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Hezbollah and the Taliban collect since they view themselves as the 
representative authorities for their respective religious sects. In both cases 
collecting a tax only further legitimizes and validates them as the governing body 
in the eyes of the local population.297  Taxes alone will not sufficiently fund these 
organizations and both have reportedly been involved in illicit businesses that 
include narcotics trafficking and arms dealing.298   
A 2011 news article from ABC News links Hezbollah and the Afghan 
Taliban through an alleged arms and drugs ring.299 Not as surprising a 
connection as many may think, Thomas Sanderson, a transnational crime 
specialist, argues that “porous borders and corrupt or ill-trained law enforcement 
in a multitude of countries have also played a role in enabling the arms trade, to 
the benefit of terrorist and organized crime groups.”300 His argument is an apt 
description of Afghanistan.  Sanderson further notes that “narcotics remains the 
most common and most lucrative form of organized crime used by terrorist 
groups such as Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU), Al Qaeda, and Hezbollah.”301 And interestingly, one of the 
biggest producers of opium happens to be Afghanistan.302  In a March 2013 
report to Congress on “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US 
Policy,” notes that “all of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan benefit, at least in 
part, from narcotics trafficking.”303 Specifically, within the Afghan Taliban there is 
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one faction known for its mafia-style operations, the Haqqani network (HQN).304  
The HQN led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, Sirajuddin, and are in charge of 
the Waziristan or Miranshah Shura faction of the Taliban, but are linked with 
foreign fighters and have a penchant for transnational criminal activity.305 
Hezbollah too is embroiled in transnational organized crime type activities and 
the businesses are not limited to drugs trafficking.306 The relative ease and 
substantial compensation from illicit activities makes it attractive to terrorist 
groups because state sponsored funds are finite and these groups require 
additional funding to support their agenda and improve their capabilities.307 
Hezbollah and the Taliban also have foreign sponsors and donors that 
provide funds to each organization.  Hezbollah has well-known sponsorships with 
Iran and Syria who give them money and arms.308 In a similar situation, the 
Taliban are reportedly supported by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 
agency and other donors from outside the region, namely Arab countries.309 
Generous donors are not going to be around forever so these organizations use 
transnational criminal activity as another income source.   
5. Foreign Sponsors 
Both organizations are linked to having foreign state sponsors who are 
crucial to the organizations’ operations.  Hezbollah has two with Iran and Syria.  
The Taliban is connected to Pakistan through its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 
agency, a group similar to the CIA. These foreign sponsors provide similar 
assistance in the way of advice, money, and resources. In doing so the 
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organizations become the state sponsor’s proxies and provides a friendly regime 
next door or in the region, but whether or not the sponsors are able to rein them 
in is another question. In Hezbollah’s case, Iran funded their institution building at 
the beginning and encouraged them to enter into politics.  Syria has played a 
fundamental part in Lebanese politics and as an “ambivalent” ally to 
Hezbollah.310  By supporting Hezbollah, Syria is able to strike at Israel through 
the group and maintain ties with Iran.  Similarly, the Taliban and Pakistan have 
an equally symbiotic relationship.  Pakistan has given the group’s top leadership 
safe haven in Quetta, Pakistan and “turned a blind eye to the militants crossing 
the border.”311  Additionally, the ISI has reportedly given the Taliban intelligence, 
tactical information, and advice. There are also accounts that the ISI provides 
money and weapons, but they are not the only source.312  Much like Iran and 
Syria with Hezbollah, Pakistan sees the value in supporting the Taliban, in part, 
as means of having a friendly power next door that they would be able to 
control.313  
C. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GROUPS 
Most people would not associate Hezbollah with the Afghan Taliban for 
several reasons, which will be addressed here.  The differences between the two 
groups are important to analyze for the same reasons the commonalities are 
important as they speak to the evolution and development of the groups. This 
section will look at their institutions, religious differences, political environments, 
and group composition. 
1. Institutions and Social Services 
Hezbollah’s institutions and social service provisions are far more robust 
than what the Taliban is offering Afghans, which is extremely limited at best and 
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relegated to justice and security.  The Party’s capacity to provide services for the 
population surpasses the government and that is hard to say for the Taliban.314  
Hezbollah’s effective and efficient institutions were at the heart of their group’s 
genesis and made for a relatively easy transition to national politics.  They also 
received a fair amount of assistance from their foreign sponsor, Iran, to be able 
to setup and maintain such systems.315  The same cannot be said for the 
Taliban as their institutions and services are still nascent and in the past had to 
rely on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  A May 2013 New York Times 
article indicates a change of heart among the group to allow NGOs into certain 
areas to conduct polio vaccinations.316 Arguably the Afghan government has not 
provided much in the way of services either, but the Taliban is even further 
behind them and there is no indication that Pakistan can assist them in building 
this capacity.317    
2. Religious Differences 
A glaring difference between the two groups is that they are from 
adversarial Islamic sects; Hezbollah is Shi’a and the Taliban are Sunni.  As much 
as they have a similar ideological stance, Hezbollah are more tolerant than the 
Taliban and do not view non-Shi’as with disdain.  Their support of the Palestinian 
cause, who are Sunni, highlights this sentiment.  Additionally, Amal Saad-
Ghorayeb explains the Party’s changed ideological stance in Hizbu’llah: Politics 
and Religion that “the cornerstone of Hizbu’llah’s doctrine on political violence is 
the principle of non-compulsion of Islam.”318 Essentially, Hezbollah does not 
believe they can impose an Islamic state on the Lebanese people because that is 
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not best for the country.319  The Party is predominantly Shi’a but their message 
appeals to other Lebanese religious groups and Hezbollah has provided support 
to provide many of them.320  The Taliban claim to be open to other Islamic sects 
and ethnicities, but their group remains about 95 percent Pashtun who are Sunni 
and predominantly from rural Southern Afghanistan.321  The Afghan group 
believes that Islam in general transcends ethnic lines, but it is their brand of Islam 
which is an archaic and radical interpretation of the religion.322  Also during their 
rule in the late 1990s the Taliban declared the Afghan Shi’a population to be 
infidels.323 Therefore, the Afghan group does not have a history of being tolerant 
of other groups within Afghanistan.  
a. The Shi’a – Sunni Split 
To further understand the religious differences between Hezbollah, 
a Shi’a group, and the Taliban, a Sunni group, a brief explanation of how the 
division within Islam occurred and what the two sects differ on is necessary. 
Basically, the root of the split is based on how leaders were selected and on what 
criteria.324  After the Prophet Mohammad died his successors were elected via a 
shura vice keeping the top position within the family blood lines.  The elected 
official was called a caliph and embodied the ideal Muslim; pious, brave, just, and 
religious. 325  Only a few years after the Prophet’s death issues surfaced dealing 
with money, new sects, and rivalries that caused in-fighting among the Muslims 
and eventually led to divisions within the Islamic community. The fourth caliph, 
Ali, cousin and son in-law of the Prophet, had his rule challenged by a couple of 
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fellow Islamic groups, which was an indicator of discord within the community.  
Ali gained support from those believing the leadership of the group should remain 
within the family of the Prophet as if special powers were passed along the 
bloodline.326  This group was called the Alids, which evolved into Shi’ism.  
Events that transpired during and after Ali’s rule, death, and subsequently the 
similar fate of his son, Husayn, are important aspects of the Shi’as’ collective 
history and explain their theme of suffering and being oppressed.327 A similar 
notion that is heavily prevalent in Hezbollah’s doctrine is the idea of supporting 
the oppressed.328  In addition, the Shi’as recognize the Imamate or the 
leadership that was “divinely inspired, sinless, infallible, religiopolitical leader of 
the community” and direct descendent of the Prophet.329  Shi’as codified their 
beliefs in books and laws which led to the creation of the Ayatollah as the human 
representative that embodied the divine spirit of the Imams and acted as their 
trusted agents since none of the Imams were known to be living.330  To the 
Shi’as the Sunnis were not legitimate followers of the faith and their Imams were 
“merely leaders of prayer.”331  The Sunnis, on the other hand, backed the caliph 
and the use of consensus for selection of their leader as well as for interpreting 
religious authority.332 After the caliph, the title of their leader became 
“commander of the believers” or amir al-mu minin, which is the same designation 
used by the Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar.333  The Sunnis did not think it was 
necessary for the leader to be a descendant of the Prophet and it could be one 
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his “companions.”334 Ultimately, Sunnis believe that Shi’as have diverged from 
the original intent of Islam and its sense of community and consensus.335     
3. Political Environment 
Hezbollah and the Taliban operate in different political environments that 
affect their growth, development, and behavior.  Lebanon has a confessional-
style government where each of the top three religious groups hold positions of 
power.  Additionally, a change was made to its constitution in 1989 with the Taif 
Accords that leveled the playing field by granting a more equal representation of 
Muslims in government.336 Iran’s insistence of the Party to participate in the 
1992 national elections played a big role in Hezbollah’s acceptance to the idea of 
participating.  Also the Lebanese government was willing to bring them into the 
fold, but under conditions that Hezbollah agreed to. Political parties allow for 
alliances that cross sectarian lines, which are seen in Lebanon.  By contrast, 
GIRoA is a democratic system that includes a president and parliament where 
the president has contested the usage of political parties and selects government 
officials below the national level because the constitution does not allow local 
elections.337  As opposed to Lebanon where there is power-sharing along a 
sectarian divide, in Afghanistan the government is dominated by one ethnic 
group with ethnic and religious divides.338  Therefore, how would the Taliban be 
co-opted into the government and how would transitioning benefit them? The use 
of Single Non-Transferable Voting (SNTV) only exacerbates the lack of unity 
within the government since Afghans must run as individuals and not necessarily 
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on causes or along party lines.339 The Taliban do not really have an incentive to 
reintegrate and co-opt with the government because they can pay or coerce 
individuals to vote a certain way. Additionally, SNTV in Afghanistan spreads the 
votes across many candidates therefore; running in the election is no guarantee 
of getting into office and creating a majority.  To makes matters worse, the bulk 
of the Afghan population is illiterate making the campaigning and voting process 
difficult because the ballot only has pictures associated with candidates and no 
party affiliation or platform information.340 
4. Group Composition 
Hezbollah is a relatively cohesive, homogeneous organization whose 
leadership is made up of classically-trained clerics and abides a common 
ideological belief.341 As a group they made the transition to a political party.  
Additionally, much of the Party members consist of middle class Shi’as.342 A 
characteristic of the group that came from the Shi’as’ history and development is 
that they are much more hierarchical and disciplined than the Sunnis who are 
more informal and based on group consensus.343 Along these lines the Taliban 
is more fractious in nature and made of a series of networks, but under a 
common leader, bond of Islam, and cause to fight international forces.344  
Giustozzi argues that these networks “have different ideological leanings and 
allegiances, with some groups being more radical than others.”345 The group is 
primarily made up of rural Pashtuns and madrassa students, but there is some 
indication that the Taliban are trying to recruit from universities in Afghan 
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cities.346  Arguably, the lack of cohesion indicates a potential problem if the 
Taliban attempt a power grab following the post-2014 international troop 
withdrawal, because there will no longer be a common cause holding them 
together and could lead to infighting as well as another civil war similar to the 
post-Soviet pullout.  
D.  CONCLUSION  
This chapter analyzed the commonalities and differences between 
Hezbollah and the Taliban.  By looking at the similarities between the two groups 
provides possible explanations for the Taliban’s recent growth in political depth.  
Are these indications of a group that is transitioning from a violent extremist 
organization to a political party like Hezbollah or possibly looking to participate in 
government or even make an attempt for a takeover after 2014.  In Seth Jones 
and Martin Libicki’s book, How Terrorist Groups End, provide research that 
narrows down how groups of this type meet their demise through either 
splintering, policing, using military force, or (on a rare occasion) taking on a 
political role.347  Hezbollah has been able to make the transition into politics 
begrudgingly and even retained their military wing.  The Taliban are still evolving, 
but with their ability to be resilient have the potential to follow the same route; 
although, splintering is also a valid possibility.348  Differences between the 
groups were also discussed and they highlight the difficulties the Taliban have in 
being able to make the transition into national politics.  The next chapter is the 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
The Afghan Taliban’s usage of the shadow governance system highlights 
the group’s growing influence in Afghanistan and evolution from their past 
government experience.  The group has reestablished their presence in a way 
that questions the viability of the government regime that the US and 
international community assisted in developing and supporting after the Taliban’s 
ouster in 2001.  Questions that need to be seriously evaluated by the 
international community; are the Taliban an alternative to the current Karzai 
regime and will they take over after the international community departs the 
country in 2014? All signs point toward yes with the Taliban attempting to out-
govern GIRoA.349  The Afghan group is legitimizing their presence through the 
implementation of a parallel government and a more complex command structure 
than the Taliban have utilized in the past; although, the crux of their legitimacy 
revolves around the justice and security they provide.350 With the US and Afghan 
Security Forces unable to deter or make significant headway against the group, 
the Taliban are becoming a serious contender as a power player for the future. 
The US sees it as necessary for their drawdown that the Taliban reconcile with 
GIRoA and take part in the political process.351 The Taliban’s evolution has been 
a few years in the making, but it should come as no surprise as other terrorist 
groups have made a similar transition to a legitimate political party or incorporate 
an influential political element into the faction.  The example of a successful 
transition used in this thesis was Hezbollah and a comparison was drawn 
between the two groups’ commonalities and differences to see if that could help 
understand the Afghan group’s recent political depth.352     
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Even though the Taliban are more sophisticated than their original version 
that was in power in the 1990s, the group is still unable to provide basic services 
to the Afghan people.  Their services are limited to providing justice and security, 
which highlights the inadequacies of the Afghan group as a potential central 
government.  Therefore, the Taliban may not offer a better solution for 
governance than GIRoA, but it is a local solution.  As discussed throughout this 
thesis, the main legitimizing factor of the Taliban is their ability to administer legal 
services to the population, which are viewed as archaic and brutal but fair.353  
Unless the group takes further steps to provide other essential services to 
Afghans, popular support will stagnant, and it will become difficult to take and 
remain in power.354  An option available to the Taliban is the threat to use of 
force or brutalize Afghans, similar to how they ruled in the 1990s, and then the 
population may conform, but Afghans, especially those that have returned from 
abroad who now have some expectations of the government.  Additionally, there 
have been uprisings to the Taliban rules, edicts, and actions in various provinces. 
The Taliban are quick to deny and dismiss such revolts among local Afghans as 
propaganda of the government.355  The group’s actions, however, speak 
otherwise with Mullah Omar reportedly authorizing commanders and governors 
to deviate from the group’s strict edicts to maintain popular support.356  It will be 
hard for the Taliban to rule the country if they cannot balance their extreme 
religious ideology with providing effective governance, which will be crucial in not 
alienating the Afghan population, especially the non-Pashtuns.  Another 
consideration worth debating is whether the organization is cohesive enough to 
even make a bid for power. The Taliban are described as a “network of 
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franchises” with differing motives and character depending on their location.357  
Jane’s breaks the group into three categories: original Taliban, neo-Taliban, and 
“mercenary elements” that are “not mutual exclusive, and…are overlaid by a 
complex web of tribal loyalties and politics.”358  Shehzad Qazi points out in his 
article, “The ‘Neo-Taliban’ and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” that 
“members of the resistance who call themselves the ‘Taliban’ are hardly a united 
group with a single vision for Afghanistan, like the 1990s Taliban.”359 Therefore, 
as 2014 draws closer it will be interesting to see if the Taliban do remain unified 
and transition to a political party. 
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The US and international community have to prepare for the possibility of 
the Taliban filling some sort of capacity in the government post-2014.  What 
exactly will their role be?  How will the international community deal with 
Afghanistan?  Even though the possibility of the Taliban taking over the 
government is a very real possibility, they could limit themselves by only seeking 
to co-opt with the current regime, which they have made some mention of being 
willing to do.360  Either way, having meaningful interactions with the Afghan 
government may be difficult due to the operations over the last ten years that 
have targeted the elimination of the group.  Also if the Taliban do take over there 
is the concern of Afghanistan falling back into being a safe haven for terrorist 
training camps.  Dealing with this possibility sooner rather than later will be 
important for the international community to maintain stability in the region.  
Another complicating note, the Taliban are not known for being adherents to 
human rights principles, which is highlighted with their poor track record for the  
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treatment of women. Aid money that is earmarked for the country’s future may be 
a way to get the group in line, but the group’s history and ideological stance may 
put that foreign aid in jeopardy. The US and international community will have to 
accurately assess the situation on the ground to determine how best to proceed if 
the Taliban indeed come into power because South Asia’s regional stability will 
be at question again, which could drag global community back.361 
B.  FURTHER RESEARCH  
With the US and international community preparing for a significant draw-
down and departure from Afghanistan in 2014 it will be necessary to continue to 
do research and studies in the region.  The standard American modus operandi 
is once the US leaves an area of operations then research and overall interest 
diminishes and continuing this method is detrimental to US national security.  
The US Army is at least realizing the importance of understanding and 
maintaining long term engagements with other cultures and groups by 
implementing regional aligned brigades where Army units will be aligned with a 
certain AOR. It will allow for a “globally responsive” capability. 362  A repeat of 
2001’s scramble to gain knowledge, information, and experts on the region was 
not beneficial for anyone, therefore, continued academic presence and 
engagement should be considered.  Developing a better understanding of groups 
like the Taliban and their motivations is important for developing suitable 
countermeasures and counterterrorism strategies.  Along these lines it is crucial 
to keep researching and studying the Taliban’s organizational structure, its 
uniformity or lack thereof, and the impact of its leadership.  If Mullah Omar is not  
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alive, will that affect the cohesiveness of the group? Will the group be able to 
stay together and be a viable alternative to GIRoA?  The Taliban are setting 
themselves up for some sort of power position after the 2014 drawdown and time 
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